Although I concur with most of the report and its recommendations, I think its emphasis on military deterrence comes at the expense of sufficient attention to the nonmilitary aspects of both the problem and its potential mitigation. The Taiwan issue is not primarily a military problem; it is fundamentally a political dilemma that will require concerted diplomatic efforts to avoid military conflict. And although the report acknowledges that military deterrence should be supplemented by reassurances to Beijing “that Washington does not seek to permanently separate Taiwan from China,” it does not sufficiently address the challenge that Washington faces in making such assurances credible.
In this regard, the report recommends that Washington “maintain its One China policy,” but without meaningfully confronting widespread concerns about the erosion of the substance and credibility of that policy. That erosion, however, is one of the main drivers of cross-strait tensions. The report explains how “the U.S. One China policy has evolved over time,” with incremental upgrades in U.S.-Taiwan relations that have stretched the limits of “unofficial” ties. Moreover, Taiwan’s own position on “one China” has evolved over time, and Beijing views Washington’s tacit acceptance of this change as implicit endorsement of Taipei’s apparent efforts to retreat from the “one China” framework. In short, there are valid questions about whether Washington is moving toward a de facto “one China, one Taiwan” policy in violation of U.S. commitments under the Three Communiqués. This is why U.S. reassurances to the contrary need to be more substantive and credible than the rhetorical reaffirmation that the One China policy has not changed.
The report attributes cross-strait tensions almost exclusively to “a more powerful and assertive China” and uncertainty about Xi Jinping’s intentions. But this assessment overlooks the extent to which Beijing’s behavior has been reactive to steps by Washington and Taipei that have themselves altered “the status quo” and weakened the “one China” framework. In this regard, I disagree with the report’s recommendation that Washington should use President Biden’s public comments about defending Taiwan “as the new baseline for U.S. declaratory policy.”
Finally, the report invokes Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner’s statement during congressional testimony in December 2021 that Taiwan is a “critical node” in the “defense of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.” But this historically new formulation would appear to provide a geostrategic military rationale for supporting Taiwan’s permanent separation from China—contrary to the reassurances that the report advises Washington to make to Beijing. This further underscores the importance of making those assurances substantive and credible.
In sum, the report appropriately advises Washington to make clear to Beijing that “the U.S. One China policy is conditional on the
—Paul Heer
A Leninist political organization, the
It would be wrong to conclude that a policy of reassurance by Washington, rather than deterrence, would reduce Beijing’s appetite for changing the status quo through force.
For many years, Washington tried to reassure both Putin and Xi by eschewing “provocative” actions; both dictators seized the opportunity to expand territorial control at the expense of other nations’ sovereignty and to the detriment of international conventions and norms. Moscow saw Washington suspend the provision of defensive weapons to Ukraine in 2021 and was emboldened. In the 2010s, Beijing saw Washington provide only tepid support for allies’ assertion of their maritime rights, and the
As the Leninist adage goes, “You probe with bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw.”
U.S. actions more recently are becoming a bit less mushy and a bit steelier. American credibility increased with President Biden’s spoken commitment to defend Taiwan against aggression and Speaker Pelosi’s resolve to visit Taipei despite an extensive CCP influence campaign against her. Had Washington buckled, questions about U.S. reliability would again have taken center stage. Allies and partners will similarly lose faith—and Beijing will be emboldened—if a U.S. president walks back the defense commitment in the future.
In addition to military power, Taiwan’s political, economic, and societal connections to other countries also enhance deterrence by increasing the costs and multiplying the victims of potential aggression. Senior officials from several allied countries have streamed into Taiwan following Pelosi. In April, when China announced missile tests in air corridors near Taiwan for eighteen hours over three days—which would have diverted hundreds of commercial flights—Taiwan, Japan, and other nations told China they would not accept such a move. Beijing backed down, reducing the disruption to a single twenty-seven-minute block.
Xi knows he is the one upending the status quo—he said as much to Putin in March. Beijing cannot be reassured because it is not really seeking reassurance. It is probing with bayonets for weakness, hoping for accommodation and concession. Maintaining the United States’ status as a global power depends on Washington showing steely resolve to deny Beijing the chance to coerce Taiwan into submission.
—Ivan Kanapathy and Matthew Pottinger
While I support many of the findings and recommendations of this report, it falls short on the following three issues.
First, at a time when threat perceptions of China are (understandably) high in the United States and the political incentives are strong for leaders to out-hawk each other on China, the report could more forcefully dispel the simplistic view that any moderation of U.S. words and actions around Taiwan is tantamount to “appeasement” that invites Chinese aggression. The report wisely points out that Washington should avoid symbolic gestures that “provoke a Chinese response” but do not “meaningfully strengthen” Taiwan’s resilience. It cites Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan as one such example that gave Beijing the opportunity to frame Washington as a destabilizing actor, and that this characterization “found purchase in parts of Southeast Asia.” But the reality is that this view was widespread, if not publicly admitted, among many U.S. allies and partners, including in Taiwan, where polling found that a majority viewed the visit as detrimental to Taiwan’s security.205 U.S. allies and partners, including the Taiwanese people, expect the United States to judiciously handle the sensitivities and stakes involved for all parties in the Taiwan Strait. This is not a sign of “weakness” but of smart diplomacy that takes Taiwan’s overall welfare into account, keeps allies and partners on our side, and reduces unnecessary friction with Beijing.
Second, the report states as fact that as Xi “approaches the end of his tenure,” the basis of his legitimacy will “shift from delivering economic growth to satisfying Chinese nationalism,” and thus increase the probability of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. It is unclear what the factual basis is for forecasting such a chain of events. The report takes this leap after citing China’s relative economic slowdown and Xi’s statements about “unification” with Taiwan as being essential for China’s “rejuvenation.” But it neglects to consider the immense consequences China would face upon launching an assault on Taiwan—from the likely loss of thousands of troops and significant decimation of military assets to economic and diplomatic isolation from, at the very least, the advanced economies of the world, all of which would fundamentally undermine China’s “rejuvenation” project and national pride that are deeply intertwined with its continued economic prosperity and stability. Failing to recognize the mutual vulnerability of all parties, including China’s, misleadingly suggests that Beijing is invulnerable and undeterrable, and only serves as a propaganda win for Xi.
Finally, while the risks of a clash with China in the Taiwan Strait are indeed growing, a Taiwan contingency should be prioritized as a pacing scenario for DOD, rather than the pacing scenario as the report recommends. This distinction is critical given growing voices from some political quarters that assert Washington should not be “distracted” by Moscow or engaged in other regions. But U.S.-China competition cannot be neatly contained to the Taiwan Strait, and Beijing is far from the only destabilizing actor in the international arena. Bestowing such a designation would send the wrong signal to adversaries and allies alike.
—Patricia M. Kim
I endorse the report because I support “the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group.” While endorsement comes with the caveat that it does “not necessarily” mean support for “every finding and recommendation,” I write separately first to express discomfort with the report’s dominant military thrust and assessment of a new baseline for strategic ambiguity. Second, although the report lists “democracy” among important U.S. interests, democracy is an inadequate shorthand for “human rights.”
The deep military expertise of Task Force members underscored the need for robust deterrence in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Alongside this military framing, the report recommends that Washington “maintain its One China policy” and states that “Washington’s approach to Beijing should focus both on making clear the risks and costs of using force against Taiwan and on reassuring it that Washington does not seek to permanently separate Taiwan from China” (emphasis added). To be sure, the United States’ One China policy is not inflexible, but the recommendation that it “should be tweaked” to make clear that it “is conditional on the PRC’s approach to Taiwan” is not accompanied by adequate grappling with how tweaking can erode Beijing’s confidence in Washington’s intentions.
The Task Force did not reach a consensus on strategic ambiguity. The report stresses that the “pressing issue is for the United States to credibly demonstrate to the PRC that it has the military capacity and the will to come to Taiwan’s defense. The Task Force also assessed that, given President Biden’s comments on four occasions that the United States would defend Taiwan, his successors should not attempt to walk back these comments and should instead use them as the new baseline for U.S. declaratory policy.” I agree with the first sentence, but the second goes too far in setting a new baseline that explicitly incorporates Biden’s comments, especially given his suggestion that the United States is bound to defend Taiwan in the same manner as defense treaty commitments to Japan and South Korea.
The report lists “democracy” among important U.S. interests. I would go further to emphasize that not only is democracy a universal value of the United Nations, but there is also a broad range of human rights, from equality to freedom of expression, that deserve highlighting. The phrase “human rights” is implicit in the report but should be explicit. The people of Taiwan fought long and hard to enjoy a panoply of rights, and China’s coercion threatens both the rights of people in Taiwan and the strength of universal norms.
Finally, I wholeheartedly endorse the calls for bolstering communication through “high-level, regular diplomatic interactions with China” as well as promoting “people-to-people ties between the United States and Taiwan.” Yet even more is needed: namely, enhanced communication channels among the United States, China, and Taiwan from high-level official interactions to low-level unofficial ones. Continuous, multivarious information flows into the policymaking process are essential to preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
—Margaret K. Lewis
Firstly, this report, for all its merits, understates the point that deterrence is composed not only of measures that convince the PRC that military action to subjugate Taiwan would come at too high a cost and with a significant risk of failure, but also of measures that convince the PRC that such action is not needed for the time being. Actions and signals by Washington that Beijing interprets as confirmation that the United States remains prepared to accept unification, so long as it is peaceful and on terms agreed upon by China and Taiwan—a position at the heart of the U.S. One China policy—helps to mitigate fear that the “window” for unification is closing and therefore to diminish the sense of urgency that fosters risk-taking. At the same time, signals that Taipei is not ruling out a future dialogue with Beijing where options for political compromise could be explored would also contribute to deterrence.
Secondly, it is important to recognize that an insistence by U.S. officials that Taiwan must be “retained” as a strategic military asset and denied to the PRC contradicts the principle embedded in the One China policy that the future arrangement is for the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to decide. The United States might take the position that ultimately no PLA forces should be deployed to Taiwan after a settlement, but that is a different argument.
Lastly, the report rightly points to the risk of gray zone aggression short of war, particularly the imposition of a quarantine or blockade based on sophistry and “lawfare” claiming PRC rights to the air and sea around Taiwan. But a much more urgent call to action is needed if Taiwan and its partners are to develop timely countermeasures that can check PRC moves in this direction and ensure resilience through adequate stockpiles of essential civil resources.
—Daniel R. Russel
joined by Douglas H. Paal
- 205Alastair Iain Johnston, Tsai Chia-hung, and George Yin, “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/04/05/when-might-us-political-support-be-unwelcome-in-taiwan/">When Might US Political Support Be Unwelcome in Taiwan?</a>,” Brookings Institution, April 5, 2023.