U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era

The island of Taiwan has a complex history marked by the interplay between Indigenous groups and multiple colonial powers, from the Dutch to the Japanese, as well as a fluid and now fraught relationship with China (see figure below). On the periphery of China’s dynastic rule, Taiwan was only settled by China toward the end of its imperial history. Significant numbers of Chinese settlers first arrived in the sixteenth century, and the island was annexed in 1684. 

The Qing dynasty exercised loose control over Taiwan until 1895, when it was forced to cede the island to Japan following its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. This loss laid bare the Qing dynasty’s failure to modernize and sparked a series of popular uprisings that overthrew imperial rule and led to the founding of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the ROC, led the Nationalists, or Kuomintang (KMT), which became the country’s ruling party. Following Sun’s death in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek took the mantle of leadership but struggled to build a modern Chinese state in the following decades, which offered Mao Zedong and his Communist followers an opportunity to exploit growing disaffection and build a base of support.

Following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States formed an alliance with the ROC, with Chiang committing substantial military forces to fighting the Japanese, a move that enabled the United States to turn its attention first to the European theater. As Chiang’s ally, President Franklin D. Roosevelt endorsed his stance that Taiwan, which had at this point been ruled by Japan for close to fifty years, should be returned to China following the war, a position that was formalized in the Cairo Declaration of 1943.3  President Harry S. Truman took this same stance in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945.4  After Japan’s surrender, the KMT began to administer the island. 

As another consequence of its alignment with Chiang, the United States became enmeshed in the Chinese Civil War, which pitted Chiang’s KMT against Mao’s Communists and broke into the open following World War II.5  The United States at one point sought to mediate an end to the political struggle, with Truman dispatching General George Marshall on an unsuccessful mission to China to negotiate a peace between the two sides.6  In Taiwan, disaffection with KMT rule grew, culminating in a large-scale uprising on February 28, 1947. The government responded by killing thousands of civilians in what become known as the February 28 massacre, or simply 228. 

The United States eventually became disillusioned with Chiang as profound disagreements arose over his military strategy and approach to dealing with the Communist insurgency. The Truman administration concluded that no level of support short of a direct military intervention on Chiang’s side could prevent a Communist takeover and decided to cut its losses. Chiang and his followers fled to Taiwan, where they hoped to regroup and retake the mainland (see figure below).  

Chiang’s decision to relocate his government to Taiwan imbued the island with symbolic significance for Mao and the newly established PRC. Indeed, the CCP views Taiwan’s continued separation as a reminder that its civil war remains unfinished and as an injustice that it continues to bear because it was weak in the face of foreign aggression. For Beijing, the Taiwan issue is a question of sovereignty, “the core of the core interests of China” that is not subject to negotiation.7  The PRC, through its One China principle, argues that “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China, and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”8  CCP propaganda asserts that Taiwan is a lost piece of territory that must be returned to China in order for the latter to be restored to its former glory. Taiwan continues to occupy a unique place in the minds of PRC citizens and leaders, remaining deeply entwined with Chinese nationalism and national identity. Given the stakes that the CCP has associated with this issue, any Chinese leader would conclude that “losing” Taiwan through a unilateral declaration of independence under the name “Taiwan” would be politically unacceptable and potentially even fatal. 

The United States resigned itself to Mao’s forces absorbing Taiwan at some point, with Truman signaling in January 1950 that the United States would not intervene to prevent such an outcome.9  North Korea’s invasion of South Korea just months later in June 1950, however, fundamentally changed the U.S. calculus—and ultimately the course of Taiwan’s history. In the wake of a Communist invasion of South Korea backed by Mao and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, Truman declared that “the occupation of Formosa [a historical name for the island] by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.”10  Pursuant to this determination, he ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent both Mao and Chiang from using the war as an opportunity to mount another attack. Reflecting on the pivotal role that these events played, U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger later remarked to PRC Premier Zhou Enlai, “There’s no question that if the Korean War hadn’t occurred. . .Taiwan would probably be today a part of the PRC.”11  

Just days after the Korean War erupted, on June 27, 1950, the Truman administration also shifted the official U.S. position on Taiwan’s status, declaring, “The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”12  The United States emphasized that Taiwan’s legal status had not yet been determined (a position the United States continues to hold). This stance was embodied in the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco, in which Japan renounced its claim to Taiwan, but the inheritor of this claim was left ambiguous. As the Cold War solidified, Chiang came to be seen as a bulwark against Communism, with the United States stationing forces in Taiwan and providing the island with substantial economic aid. In 1954, following the PRC’s shelling of Taiwan’s offshore islands, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration signed a mutual defense treaty with the ROC. 

Although Chiang was perceived as an important partner in fighting Communism, he was in no way a democrat. Instead, he imposed martial law, arguing that the move was necessary given the ongoing fight against the Communists. The KMT government jailed and executed political dissidents during a decades-long period that became known as the White Terror. Native Taiwanese had almost no say in their governance because Chiang claimed to represent all of China, of which Taiwan was just a small part, and he used this justification to limit their political power. Though many Americans were uncomfortable with Chiang’s repressive governance, Washington continued to support him as a partner in the Cold War. Later, the United States would play an important role in pressing Chiang’s government to loosen its control over the population and adopt political reforms. 

The formal alliance between the United States and the ROC began to fray as it became harder to maintain the fictions that Chiang represented all of China or that Mao’s Communist regime would collapse. The decisive factor in the next major evolution of U.S.-Taiwan and cross-strait relations, however, was the growing convergence between Washington and Beijing on the need to counter the Soviet Union. As the Sino-Soviet split burst into the open, President Richard M. Nixon saw an opportunity to pursue a rapprochement with the PRC based on their shared enmity toward the Soviet Union.  

The United States viewed Taiwan as one of many issues to discuss with the PRC during the normalization process, but it was by far the most important to the PRC. The PRC made clear that it was prepared to abandon normalization and forgo any strategic cooperation with the United States unless it broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The United States sought a formula that would enable it to maintain some form of official relationship with Taiwan, such as a liaison office or consulate in Taipei, as well as a commitment from the PRC to resolve cross-strait issues peacefully, but the PRC flatly rejected such a proposal. Instead, it insisted that the United States withdraw its recognition of the ROC, terminate its mutual defense treaty, and remove all U.S. military personnel from the island, arguing that it was up to the Chinese how to resolve this “internal affair.”13

Although they were unable to settle these fundamental differences, in 1972 the United States and China negotiated what became known as the Shanghai Communiqué, in which the two sides finessed their positions in a way that both could accept. In this communiqué, the United States “acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.”  

The wording of each clause is significant and deserves further scrutiny. The United States took note of—or “acknowledged”—the Chinese position that Taiwan was a part of China without agreeing with or endorsing it. The communiqué noted that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait” held this position, gesturing to the fact that Chiang and Mao both took this view that Taiwan was a part of China. Importantly, however, there is no mention of Taiwanese views on this question, as their voices were excluded during this period of authoritarian rule. The United States also agreed not to challenge the Chinese position on Taiwan, in essence forgoing a policy of “One China, One Taiwan” or “Two Chinas.” Finally, by reaffirming its interest in a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences by the two sides, the United States signaled its expectation that force would not be used and that it had no desire to mediate this dispute. 

Following years of stalled negotiations, on December 15, 1978, the Jimmy Carter administration issued a communiqué announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and PRC, which went into effect on January 1, 1979.14  The United States severed diplomatic ties with the ROC and recognized “the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.” Washington again acknowledged—but did not recognize—Beijing’s position that there is one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States also terminated its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan and committed to removing its military forces from the island. At the same time, however, the United States did not agree to stop selling defensive arms to Taiwan, nor did it renounce the right to come to Taiwan’s defense. 

The U.S. Congress, in part due to its resentment at being left out of the normalization process and the Carter administration’s decision to abrogate a treaty without going through legislative channels, took the lead in crafting what the United States’ unofficial relationship with Taiwan would look like. It dramatically altered the legislation that the Carter administration envisioned into something approaching a security guarantee. The Taiwan Relations Act, signed into law in 1979, established a nonprofit corporation, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), to oversee cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.15  In addition, the TRA asserts that it is U.S. policy to 

• declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; 

• make clear that the United States’ decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; 

• consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; 

• provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and 

• maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. 

During negotiations with the PRC, Washington was unable to secure a pledge from Beijing that it would not use force against Taiwan. In the absence of that, the TRA makes an explicit linkage between the decision to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC and its handling of cross-strait issues. Although the TRA does not commit the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense, it obligates the United States to maintain the capacity to do so. It also asserts a U.S. interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and notes that a use of force, boycott, or embargo against Taiwan would be “of grave concern to the United States,” leaving the door open for U.S. intervention. 

One major sticking point during negotiations over normalization was whether the United States would continue to sell arms to Taiwan. Although Beijing moved forward with normalization despite its objections to U.S. arms sales, it continued to seek a resolution on this matter. Thus the Ronald Reagan administration negotiated a communiqué with China in 1982 to address this issue. In this communiqué, the United States stated that it “does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.” In addition, the United States stated explicitly for the first time that it “has no intention of…pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan.’”16   

President Reagan outlined his understanding of the communiqué in an internal memorandum, noting that “the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences. It should be clearly understood that the linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy. In addition, it is essential that the quality and quantity of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan’s defense capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.”  

Thus the cross-strait military balance would inform U.S. arms sales decisions; if China built up its forces targeting Taiwan, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would not decline. Reagan also penned a private letter to Deng Xiaoping, then China’s paramount leader, reiterating that “the United States has an abiding interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.”17  The assertion of an “abiding interest” in the Taiwan Strait signaled again to China that the United States reserved the right to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf if the PRC used force. Importantly, however, Reagan’s memorandum and letter represent unilateral interpretations that were never negotiated with or accepted by the PRC. 

Attempting to allay concerns in Taipei, the Reagan administration in August 1982 privately conveyed to Taiwan assurances of what the United States had not agreed to in its negotiations with China, which became known as the Six Assurances.18  In particular, the United States  

• had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; 

• had not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan;

• will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; 

• had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; 

• had not agreed to take any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and 

• will not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC. 

For nearly four decades, the Six Assurances and Reagan’s internal memorandum remained classified, assuming an almost mythical quality. Debates raged about the tenses used in each assurance. Now that they have been declassified, what is clear is that most of the assurances spoke about what the United States had not agreed to when it negotiated the third communiqué with China, rather than what it would not agree to.19  The third and sixth assurances, however, make unequivocal statements about enduring U.S. policy, noting that Washington would not pressure Taipei to enter into negotiations with Beijing or mediate this dispute. 

Taken together, the three U.S.-China joint communiqués, the TRA, and the Six Assurances are referred to in shorthand as the One China policy.20  Under its One China policy, the United States 

• recognizes the PRC as the sole legal government of China and does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan; 

• acknowledges (but does not accept or endorse) the PRC claim that there is one China, of which Taiwan is a part, while simultaneously pledging not to challenge China’s view or enact policies that are inconsistent with a one China framework (i.e., support for “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”); 

• does not take a position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan and views its status as undetermined; 

• does not take a position on what any resolution of cross-strait differences should look like, instead prioritizing process, in particular that any outcome needs to be arrived at peacefully; 

• asserts an interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, leaving open the possibility of intervening militarily on Taiwan’s behalf; 

• commits to providing Taiwan with weapons that enable it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability; and 

• makes a linkage between its One China policy and diplomatic ties with the PRC and Beijing’s continued nonuse of force against Taiwan.21  

Two additional, important elements have been added to the U.S. One China policy over time. First, in a nod to Taiwan’s democratization, President Bill Clinton asserted that cross-strait issues “must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.”22  This formulation makes clear that the United States would not support a settlement that is imposed on the Taiwanese. Clinton also became the first president to explicitly state that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence, while also adding that the United States does not believe that Taiwan should be a member in any international organization in which statehood is a requirement.23  This statement was intended to signal to Taiwan that it did not have a blank check and that U.S. support would be conditional on Taiwan not provoking the PRC. 

Although Washington’s One China policy provides a broad framework for defining and conducting U.S.-Taiwan relations, it leaves room for policymakers to use their discretion to determine which actions are consistent with this policy. For instance, following the Taiwan Policy Review in 1994, AIT personnel began attending meetings in Taiwan’s government buildings, and cabinet-level U.S. officials could travel to Taiwan on a case-by-case basis. The United States also chose to take a more active role in supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations (although it would not support Taiwan’s full membership if the organization required statehood to join). Beginning in 2003, U.S. Foreign Service officers no longer had to resign from the State Department before joining AIT, and a few years later, active-duty military officers began serving at AIT (rather than just retired military personnel).24  In 2020–21, the Donald Trump and Joe Biden administrations revised the guidelines that regulated executive branch contact with Taiwan’s representatives in Washington to make them the least restrictive they had been in practice since 1979. These moves reflect a bipartisan consensus that Taiwan should be viewed as an important partner in its own right, rather than as a troublesome aspect of U.S.-China relations. 

The U.S. One China policy has evolved over time and can be expected to continue to do so as dynamics in the Taiwan Strait change. One constant throughout this history, however, has been the U.S. desire to moderate or balance the most extreme impulses of both sides. This conviction has meant signaling to Beijing that it would pay an enormous price if it attempted to resolve cross-strait differences coercively—potentially to include direct U.S. military intervention—while also stressing to Taiwan that it cannot act with impunity. The question going forward is what approach is most likely to ensure cross-strait stability in the context of a more powerful and assertive China. 

• 3Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, “<a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/cairo-declaration">The Cairo Declaration</a>,” press communiqué, November 26, 1943. In this declaration, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang stated “that Japan, shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”
• 4Harry S. Truman, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, “<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d1382">Proclamation by the Heads of Governments, United States, China, and the United Kingdom</a>,” proclamation no. 1382 (July 26, 1945), <em>Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Proclamation 1382 of 1945</em>, <em>Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945</em>, vol. 2, ed. Richardson Dougall (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960). The Potsdam Declaration specified, “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”
• 5This discussion of U.S.-Taiwan relations draws on Alan D. Romberg, <em>Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations</em> (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2003).
• 6

  The best book on this chapter of history is Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, The China Mission: George Marshall’s Unfinished War, 1945–1947 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018).

• 7Qin Gang, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/202303/t20230307_11037190.html">Foreign Minister Qin Gang Meets the Press</a>,” (press conference, Beijing, March 7, 2023).
• 8State Council Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” white paper, February 21, 2000, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/white.htm.
• 9

  On January 5, 1950, President Truman issued that the following statement: “The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.” Romberg, Rein In at the Brink, 2.

• 10

  Romberg, Rein In at the Brink, 2.

• 11U.S. Department of State, “<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d139">Memorandum of Conversation</a>,” Beijing, July 9, 1971, in <em>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976</em>, vol. 17, China, 1969–1972, ed. Stephen E. Phillips (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006).
• 12

  Harry S. Truman, “Statement Issued by the President,” document 119, June 27, 1950, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. 7, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 202-203.

• 13

  Romberg, Rein In at the Brink, 29–41.

• 14American Institute in Taiwan, “<a href="https://www.ait.org.tw/u-s-prc-joint-communique-1979/">U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué (1979)</a>,” January 1, 1979.
• 15

  Taiwan Relations Act, H.R. 2479, 96th Cong. (1979).

• 16American Institute in Taiwan, “<a href="https://www.ait.org.tw/u-s-prc-joint-communique-1982/">U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué (1982)</a>,” August 17, 1982.
• 17

  . Romberg, Rein In at the Brink, 132.

• 18George Shultz, “<a href="https://www.ait.org.tw/declassified-cables-taiwan-arms-sales-six-assurances-1982/">Declassified Cables: Taiwan Arm Sales and Six Assurances (1982), Assurance for Taiwan Cable</a>,” declassified cable, August 17, 1982.
• 19George Shultz, “<a href="https://www.ait.org.tw/declassified-cables-taiwan-arms-sales-six-assurances-1982/">Declassified Cables</a>.”
• 20For more on the U.S. One China policy, see Richard C. Bush, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-one-china-policy-primer/"><em>A One-China Policy Primer</em></a> (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2017); Alan D. Romberg, “<a href="https://www.stimson.org/2007/us-one-china-policy-time-change/">The U.S. ‘One China’ Policy: Time for a Change?</a>,” Charles Neuhauser Memorial Lecture at the John K. Fairbank Center of Harvard University, October 24, 2007; and Shirley Kan, “<a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL30341.pdf">China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy—Key Statements From Washington, Beijing, and Taipei</a>,” Congressional Research Service, October 10, 2014.
• 21

  Multiple senior officials have made this point over the years. For instance, Secretary of State Warren Christopher asserted, “our ‘one China’ policy is predicated on the PRC’s pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the issues between Taipei and Beijing.” Romberg, Rein In at the Brink, 177.

• 22Kan, “<a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL30341.pdf">China/Taiwan</a>,” 69.
• 23Office of the Press Secretary (Shanghai, People’s Republic of China), “<a href="https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1998/06/1998-06-30-remarks-by-president-and-first-lady-at-shanghai-library.html">Remarks by the President and the First Lady in Discussion on Shaping China for the 21st Century</a>,” Shanghai Library, June 30, 1998.
• 24

  The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H.R. 1646, September 30, 2002, sec. 326.