

How India Disrupts and Navigates the World Trade Organization

Inu Manak, Council on Foreign Relations

Introduction

India is a contradiction in the World Trade Organization (WTO): both a norm-breaker and a dealmaker. When the WTO was established in 1995, India had already begun a series of economic reforms to help it take advantage of the benefits of global trade and grow into a force to be reckoned with in international institutions. However, India has both resisted and embraced multilateralism depending on the balance of its offensive and defensive trade interests. As reforms slowed down in the 2000s and the multilateral trade negotiations called the Doha round failed in 2011, India became a force for obstruction, partnering with different groups of countries to lead by disrupting the WTO. Furthermore, the notable decline of U.S. power in the organization and disinterest in the multilateral trading system has left a substantial governance gap and increased India's influence.

In three important normative areas of WTO discussion—plurilaterals, agricultural negotiations, and special and differential treatment (SDT)—India has tried to carve out an ostensibly principled position as the voice of Global South nations. However, its actions have undermined progress at the WTO and weakened India's own potential to reap, in the long run, further benefits from the international trading system.

The Plurilateral Game in Town That India Does Not Want to Play

Plurilateral deals have become an important component of the WTO's rulebook, a normative practice India opposes.¹

Plurilateral deals allow a subset of members to pursue talks on a specific subject, provided they meet a critical mass or sufficient portion of members. Plurilateralism arose in response to criticism that the WTO had become irrelevant due to its principle of decision by consensus—that is, when negotiating new high-standard trade rules to keep up with changing times, all members had to sign off on deals whether or not they were part of negotiations.² With 166 WTO members it is increasingly difficult to conclude multilateral talks among all. Furthermore, some members do not have the capacity to negotiate or have not established a presence in the market under consideration.

Plurilaterals, like multilaterals, can extend benefits to all members even if they are not part of negotiations, or they can discriminate against members not party to the deal.³ Some plurilaterals create new rules; others do not.⁴ Overall, they have become crucial to the WTO architecture.

India, alongside South Africa, has objected to all plurilateral deals, claiming erroneously that they are illegal in the WTO.⁵ For example, India opposes the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement, a deal reached by 125 (mostly developing-country) members to improve transparency and good governance in domestic investment procedures, in order to create a sound investment

climate and attract foreign direct investment. Some estimates suggest that deal could generate global welfare gains between \$250 billion and \$1,120 billion, primarily benefiting poorer countries.⁶ Yet, India, while publicly stating a desire for increasing foreign investment, has vehemently opposed it.⁷

India's opposition references a decision by the General Council (the WTO's highest-level decision-making body)—that negotiations on the “Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy and Transparency in Government Procurement” would not be part of the Doha round of negotiations—as evidence there is no mandate to discuss trade-related investment issues.⁸ But India has similarly opposed other recent plurilaterals on the basis that there is no express mandate to negotiate them.

However, the Government Procurement Agreement (a plurilateral only extending benefits to signatories) entered into force in 1994 and has been subsequently modified, with no similar objection made. Few WTO members support a return to multilateral negotiating rounds covering a broad range of issues, often referred to as a single undertaking. Furthermore, any mandate the WTO has is decided by its membership, and therefore, a decision by the General Council is not law but a guiding framework subject to change by members if they find an alternative way forward. In citing the General Council's statement as evidence and opposing plurilaterals, which nearly all members support, India largely stands alone as a norm-breaker. Unfortunately, it also holds the key to closing any deal other members want to undertake, because India can effectively block a deal's adoption unless it receives something in return.

India's Objections to Agricultural Negotiations

India also disrupts changing norms in agricultural negotiations. Distortions in agricultural markets and the entry of new major players have caused norms to evolve, as has the need to address modern, emerging concerns such as climate change. India is committed to the Doha work program, which emphasized the specific challenges that developing countries faced in implementing WTO commitments and has joined a group of developing countries in resisting both exploration of a new agenda and “fresh thinking” in agriculture.⁹

The new agenda on agriculture goes beyond old debates over reducing space for trade-distorting agricultural support.¹⁰ It also includes balancing members' domestic agricultural concerns related to food security and repurposing subsidies to enable them to address climate change.¹¹ Members providing domestic support to their own agricultural sectors is one of the most contentious ongoing debates at the WTO, despite the fact that the Agreement on Agriculture strikes a fine balance between giving members space to address domestic agricultural concerns, while at the same time ensuring that trade distorting practices are limited.

WTO rules divide agricultural support into four categories, the first of which is subject to imposed limits: the “amber box,” which has a more than minimal trade distorting effect; the “blue box,” which addresses distortion of amber subsidies with a production curb; the “green box,” which have no or minimal distortive effect on trade; and the “development box,” or Article 6.2, which gives special flexibilities to developing countries.¹²

Domestic support measures can increase production and could help improve productivity (e.g., by inducing the use of improved seeds), but they can also introduce new inefficiencies or amplify old ones.¹³ Importantly, support is concentrated among a handful of countries because few have the resources to invest heavily in their agricultural sectors, and even those that do usually aid only their largest producers. Furthermore, although some supports—such as research-and-development investments in creating improved seeds—have improved productivity, providing trade-distorting support to inefficient producers keeps them in the market longer than they should be. Higher prices due to price supports also impact consumers or government fiscal expenditures. The former creates greater inequalities in the market, while the latter stresses government budgets.

Trade-distorting agricultural domestic support notified to the WTO has decreased over time in nominal value and as a percentage of the value of agricultural production, while support that has no (or a minimally trade-distorting) effect has seen notable growth.¹⁴ However, that decrease has not meant distorting support is no longer a problem. Pandemic disruptions and post-pandemic tensions fueled some recent spikes in support: for example, between 2021 and 2023, total agricultural subsidies and price support of fifty-four countries reached historic highs of nearly \$850 billion a year.¹⁵ According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), agricultural price support and input subsidies are potentially the most distorting forms of support.

Just five to ten WTO members provide the bulk of domestic support to their agricultural sectors. The United States, China, India, Japan, and the European Union account for nearly 90 percent of all notified support.¹⁶ That is because WTO rules in the Agreement on Agriculture have not been sufficiently updated, reflecting market conditions and support levels from a time when China and India did not play as large a role in global agricultural markets, and also provided less support to their own sectors than the major developed economies. The shift in conditions without a corresponding change in the WTO rules now makes adjusting global inequities produced by that domestic support more difficult.

Today, India has banded with China and some other developing countries to resist reductions in, and even expand, their space for domestic support measures. India's primary concern has been to address food security needs and support its farmers, a large and politically powerful constituency of 260 million people (about 1 in 5 Indians).¹⁷ Recent figures put India's support measures at \$48 billion, the highest in the WTO.¹⁸

India also maintains significant price support for rice and wheat through "public stockholding." That practice involves acquiring stock from farmers at set prices, retaining those stocks to maintain steady prices and supply on the production side, and providing those food grains to low-income households at subsidized cost. Estimates suggest China and India together hold two-thirds of global grain stocks.¹⁹ Simultaneously, India is the leading global exporter of rice, raising concerns over how its subsidies could be supporting its export growth in this market.²⁰

The table below provides an overview of current support levels by the largest support-providing WTO members. Notably, because of its stockholding-related market-price support, India continues to be the only member in breach of its support limits, which has frustrated other members and revitalized the debate on how support limits are calculated.²¹

Agricultural Support Reported by Largest Contributors (Billions of Dollars)

Table with 6 columns and 12 rows. (column headers with buttons are sortable)

	India	United States	China	European Union	Japan
Reporting Year	2022/23	2022/23	2022	2021/22	2022/23
All Domestic Support	\$105	\$216	\$210	\$99	\$21
Green Box	\$45	\$197	\$184	\$81	\$14
General Services (para. 2)	\$3	\$18	\$91	\$8	\$10
Public Stockholding (para. 3)	\$34	-	\$14	-	-
Domestic Food Aid (para. 4)*		\$173	-	\$1	-
Payments to Producers (paras. 5–13)	\$8	\$6	\$79	\$72	\$5
Amber Box	\$12	\$19	\$17	\$12	\$7
Product-Specific AMSs	\$8	\$17	\$7	\$10	\$2
Non-Product-Specific AMS	\$5	\$1	\$9	\$2	\$4
Development Box (Article 6.2)	\$48	-	-	-	-
Blue Box (Article 6.5)	-	-	\$9	\$5	-

Notes: Sums shown in bold may differ from sums of components due to rounding. Nil values or those that round to zero indicated by “-”. Green box “paras.” refer to Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Only AMSs exceeding “de minimis” 5 percent of value of production count against a member’s support limit for the EU, Japan, and the United States (8.5 percent for China and 10 percent for India). Support limits are \$79 billion for the EU, \$36 billion for Japan, and \$19 billion for the United States, while China and India are limited to nil. *India reports public stockholding and domestic food aid as a single amount.

Source: Adapted from a table prepared by Lars Brink from member notifications through 2024, updating analysis in Brink and Orden (2023).

COUNCIL
FOREIGN
RELATIONS

India Preserves Power Through Special and Differential Treatment

India has also worked with China, South Africa, and Venezuela to strongly object to attempts to reform special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing country members. How best to address the unique needs of developing countries has long institutional roots in the WTO. The preamble of the WTO founding document is clear about the commitment to development “that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”²² With 166 members, many of them developing countries, the WTO needs to integrate a diverse set of countries into its rule framework.

However, the WTO faces a unique challenge: unlike other international organizations, it has no objective measures of development but instead relies on members to self-declare whether they are developing countries and need SDT. It allows developing country members greater flexibility in their commitments, including longer phase-in periods for their obligations, carve-outs, and technical support.²³ Yet, this approach does not allow for differentiation among developing country members, and instead lumps them all together (with the exception of the Least Developed Countries).²⁴ The result is a failure to deliver tailored support reflecting members’ specific needs.

In 2019, a new approach to SDT gained support. It called for more granular differentiation to prevent larger developing country members from free-riding on benefits that should not accrue to them. The United States led the reshaping of the accepted norm, though it failed to achieve wholesale reforms.²⁵ The U.S. proposal called for limiting access to SDT if members are part of OECD or have begun the accession process to become so, are part of the Group of Twenty, are classified as high-income countries by the World Bank, or account for 0.5 percent or more of global merchandise trade (imports and exports). At the time of the proposal, more than thirty WTO members that consider themselves to be developing countries, including India, would fall under at least one of those criteria.²⁶

India strongly objected to any changes, arguing not only that SDT was a treaty-given right but also that significant development gaps persist that warrant preserving the status quo.²⁷ Most WTO members disagreed. Many were developing country members who complained that some developing countries with a significantly greater presence in global markets, such as India, were silencing attempts to generate more targeted developing-country support in order to preserve maximum levels of flexibility for themselves.²⁸

Despite broad agreement that SDT has failed to help countries meet their commitments, India continues to push for greater flexibility. For example, India is largely responsible for the inability to conclude a comprehensive agreement to rein in harmful fisheries subsidies: it demanded phase-in periods for developing countries that were so long as to render its commitments meaningless.²⁹ In the final, pared-back deal, India quickly declared victory, noting it was able to preserve subsidies for its own fishermen.³⁰ A deal on the second phase of harmful fisheries subsidies remains elusive due to India’s continued opposition to high-standard disciplines.³¹

India does not acknowledge that its unwillingness to take on obligations matching its level of development and economic needs is causing long-term self-harm. Preservation of the status quo, which India also dislikes, therefore becomes a better outcome than any substantive change requiring the country to step up and take on greater responsibility to shape a fairer trading system.

The Way Forward for the United States and the WTO

A discussion of how India navigates three issues at the WTO—plurilaterals, agriculture talks, and SDT—shows how the country has willingly disrupted the rules-based trading system through its consistent norm breaking, as well as how it effectively vetoes progress in fashioning itself a dealmaker in different groupings. What is striking is India’s opposition not just to established norms but also to changing norms and emerging consensuses. India’s strategy is driven by two goals. First, in opposing plurilaterals it is ensuring that compromises are struck on the lowest common denominator, which means India aims to oppose high-standard rules so that its own discriminatory trade practices will go untouched. It is also ensuring no new rules will be developed on modern issues of importance. In fact, Indian Minister Piyush Goyal has also gone on record opposing discussions on gender, climate change, and labor.³² Second, in categorizing itself as part of a vulnerable group without actually sharing its vulnerabilities, India preserves a high degree of flexibility in the domestic actions it can pursue. For example, statistically speaking, the levels of domestic supports in agriculture that India can provide exceed those of most developing countries.

The primary problem in getting India to play a more constructive role is that the chief architect of that system, the United States, has been asking for additional flexibilities for itself and has openly flouted the rules. To be fair, the United States has pushed back on India in some cases, if in limited form. Notably, the United States, which is not part of the IFD agreement, reacted firmly to India’s objection during a December 2023 General Council meeting. The U.S. delegate stated, “We disagree with . . . South Africa, India and Namibia; we do believe that the WTO system does provide for and can sustain plurilateral initiatives.”³³ However, when U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai visited India the following month, the readout provided little indication that the issue was ever discussed, missing an opportunity to raise the topic bilaterally and convey U.S. concerns to India.³⁴

Building consensus would require the United States to convince India to drop its objection to plurilaterals.³⁵ Alternatively, discussions could move out of the WTO, but members would lose institutional provisions, such as secretariat support, transparency through a committee, and dispute settlement. Until then, WTO negotiations remain at a virtual standstill as India refuses to let modern issues progress while failing to flexibly address long-standing concerns.

In November 2024, the United States, along with Argentina, Australia, Canada, and Ukraine, accused India of “providing significant market price support . . . for rice and wheat,” claiming India’s market price supports of 87 percent for rice and 67 to 75 percent for wheat vastly exceeded its allowable levels of 10 percent (see table 1).³⁶ Still, the United States needs to push India and the WTO at large to rethink domestic support to account for growing WTO membership and changes in the agricultural trade landscape. Economists Lars Brink and David Orden outline a few suggestions for reform, including making the WTO rules more consistent across members, improving how price support is

measured, and modifying rules to more effectively address modern priorities such as biosecurity, biodiversity, and climate change.³⁷

For a fairer trading system, the United States should not decrease its own commitments but ask others to increase theirs. That means completing the WTO reform discussions and making progress on the three areas highlighted above. Crafting new high-standard rules on digital trade and convincing India to drop its opposition will send a strong signal to China and other nonmarket economies that a free and open internet is an essential component of the trading system and healthy societies. Breaking the deadlock on agriculture negotiations will also help the United States curb abuses of agricultural support measures and ensure legitimate food security concerns receive the attention they deserve. It will also allow for discussions of how to retool existing subsidies to support more efficient farming practices. Finally, agreeing to clearer distinctions between developing-country members will help guarantee more targeted and equal treatment in line with development needs, ensuring also that developing countries with significant market shares in specific sectors under negotiation cannot escape high-standard rules.

Inu Manak is a fellow for trade policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Endnotes

1. For a summary of past and current plurilaterals, see <https://wtoplurilaterals.info>.
2. For a detailed explanation of how plurilateral rules or commitments are incorporated into the existing WTO architecture, see <https://tradebetablog.wordpress.com/technical-types-of-plurilateral-adding-to-wto>.
3. The Trade Facilitation Agreement is an example of the former, the Government Procurement Agreement is an example of the latter.
4. The Investment Facilitation for Development agreement and the ecommerce talks, for example, create new rules. The Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation does not create new rules, but instead requires members to simply make new commitments by adjusting the schedule of concessions they have submitted to the WTO.
5. “Statement by India on Agenda Item 18, General Council Meeting—13,” World Trade Organization, WT/GC/262, December 15, 2023, <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/262.pdf&Open=True>.
6. Edward J. Balistreri and Zoryana Olekseyuk, “Economic Impacts of Investment Facilitation,” Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, 2021, <https://www.idos-research.de/en/others-publications/article/economic-impacts-of-investment-facilitation>.
7. “Statement by India on Agenda Item 18”; South Africa and Turkey joined India in blocking the adoption of the IFD in 2024; unlike India, though, they suggested that they were willing to engage in discussions with the negotiating parties on the matter. See, General Council, Minutes of the Meeting (March 21–22, 2024), WT/GC/M/210 (paras. 8.18, 8.42) <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/M210.pdf&Open=True>.
8. That decision was part of the 2004 Doha development agenda’s work program; World Trade Organization, “Doha Work Programme,” August 1, 2004, <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/L/579.pdf&Open=True>.
9. “The Doha Declaration Explained,” World Trade Organization, accessed January 8, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm; “Fresh Thinking Needed to Move Agriculture Talks Forward, Says Chair,” World Trade Organization, April 16, 2024, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/agng_16apr24_e.htm#:~:text=AGRICULTURE%20NEGOTIATIONS-,Fresh%20thinking%20needed%20to%20move%20agriculture%20talks%20forward%2C%20says%20Chair,persistent%20deadlock%20in%20the%20talks.
10. Furthering that objective beyond what was initially agreed is embedded in Article 20 of the WTO’s 1994 Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), which called on members to continue negotiations to reduce trade barriers in agriculture and gradually decrease agricultural support. The AoA focused on three pillars: market access issues affecting imports; “domestic support,” or subsidies for agriculture production, direct payments to farmers, and price supports; and export subsidies. See “Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers,” World Trade Organization, accessed January 8, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm.
11. “Climate-Smart Agriculture,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, accessed January 8, 2025, <https://www.fao.org/climate-smart-agriculture/en/>; “Sustainable Food and Agriculture,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, accessed January 8, 2025, <https://www.fao.org/sustainability/en>.
- 12 The amber box, which encompasses most policies that have a more-than-minimal trade-distorting effect. Amber box support includes most input subsidies, payments made to producers tied to prices or production levels, and market price supports. Amber box support, also known as support measured in an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), can also be specific to a product, or not. Green box subsidies have no or minimal distortive effect on trade, these include general services, such as research and development or pest and disease control, as well as domestic food aid programs and certain payments to producers, such as income support not tied to prices or production decisions, certain risk insurance, and environmental programs. Under Article 6.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, developing countries (with China an exception) are given specific flexibilities, without limits, to assist poor farmers, such as through investment subsidies and input subsidies for fertilizer, electricity, and irrigation. For a description of the domestic support categories see: Peter Ungphakorn, “Technical Note: Agricultural Domestic Support Categories in the WTO,” *Trade Beta Blog*, updated January 2, 2024, <https://tradebetablog.wordpress.com/technical-note-agricultural-domestic-support-categories-in-the-wto>.
13. For example, the OECD, which calculates market-price support differently from the WTO, explains that “higher prices arising from price policies in many countries implicitly taxed consumers. Overall, consumers across the 54 countries covered were taxed in the amount of USD 138 billion, or 3% of their expenditures at farm-gate prices, which adds to consumers’ cost of living.” https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2024_74da57ed-en.html; Price-support calculations from the OECD and WTO are not comparable due to the way WTO calculation rules are applied: the OECD compares price-support levels to concurrent world reference prices, whereas the WTO AoA uses a comparison to reference prices from 1986 to 1988 for its original members. (The reference price is different for China because of its accession in 2001). See “Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2024: Innovation for Sustainable Productivity Growth,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2024.
14. Charlotte Hebebrand and Joseph Glauber, “Policy Seminar: Then and Now—a Look at Domestic Support,” International Food Policy Research Institute, June 21, 2023, <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/policy-seminar-then-and-now-look-domestic-support>.
15. OECD, “Agricultural Policy Monitoring.”
16. Lars Brink and David Orden, *Agricultural Domestic Support Under the WTO: Experience and Prospects*. Cambridge University Press, 2023.
17. Tripti Lahiri and Krishna Pokharel, “India’s Most Powerful Politician in Generations Can’t Win Over Its Farmers,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 20, 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/world/india/indias-most-powerful-politician-in-generations-cant-win-over-its-farmers-992d35ad>.

18. Lars Brink, “Possible Areas of Convergence in the Most Recent Proposals on Domestic Support: African Group and Pakistan, Cairns Group and Ukraine, and India,” (Webinar: “WTO Agriculture Negotiations on Domestic Support: Making New Rules Work for LDCs and Other Vulnerable Economies”), International Institute for Sustainable Development and International Food Policy Research Institute, May 2, 2024, https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2024-05/presentation_lars_brink_agriculture_domestic_support.pdf.
19. Joseph Glauber, “Public Stockholding Programs and the WTO,” Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, September 2024, <https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/e72546a4-0033-4cb3-bc1f-c56115fbd38a/content>.
20. “Rice Export Prices Highest in More Than a Decade as India Restricts Trade,” U.S. Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, September 19, 2023, <https://fas.usda.gov/data/rice-export-prices-highest-more-decade-india-restricts-trade#:~:text=India%2C%20the%20world's%20largest%20rice,Years%20as%20India%20Restricts%20Trade>.
21. Glauber, “Public Stockholding”; Peter Ungphakorn, “Simply Put: ‘PSH,’ the Biggest Controversy in the WTO Agriculture Talks,” *Trade Beta Blog*, February 25, 2024, <https://tradedetablog.wordpress.com/2024/02/25/simply-psh-biggest-controversy-wto>. In November 2024, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Ukraine, and the United States, accused India of “providing significant market price support, both in terms of absolute value and as a percentage of the value of production, for rice and wheat,” claiming that India’s market price supports of 87% for rice and 67–75% for wheat vastly exceeds its allowable levels of 10%. See, “Certain Measures of India Providing Market Price Support to Rice and Wheat: Communication from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Ukraine, and the United States Pursuant to Article 18.7 of the Agreement on Agriculture,” World Trade Organization, G/AG/W/250, November 11, 2024, <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/G/AG/W250.pdf&Open=True>.
22. World Trade Organization, “Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,” April 15, 1994, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/marag_e.htm.
23. “Special and Differential Treatment Provisions,” World Trade Organization, accessed January 8, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm.
24. Least developed countries are defined by the United Nations and receive a special status at the WTO.
25. James Bacchus and Inu Manak, “The Development Dimension: What to Do About Differential Treatment in Trade,” Cato Institute, April 13, 2020, <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-04/PA-887-update.pdf>.
26. James Bacchus and Inu Manak, “The Development Dimension: What to Do About Differential Treatment in Trade,” Cato Institute, April 13, 2020, <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-04/PA-887-update.pdf>.
27. “The Continued Relevance of Special and Differential Treatment in Favor of Developing Members to Promote Development and Ensure Inclusiveness: Communication From China, India, South Africa and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” World Trade Organization, WT/GC/W/765, February 18, 2019, <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/W765.pdf&Open=True>.
28. James Bacchus and Inu Manak, *The Development Dimension: Special and Differential Treatment in Trade* (Routledge, 2021), <https://www.routledge.com/The-Development-Dimension-Special-and-Differential-Treatment-in-Trade/Bacchus-Manak/p/book/9780367761080?srsltid=AfmBOozCxsCbEJhAJEJanfFNysjLUkOXh1YduAwDrnX97Fz03qmwvG>.
29. Simon Lester, “Q & A With Inu Manak on WTO Fisheries Subsidies Deal,” *China Trade Monitor*, June 21, 2022, <https://www.chinatrademonitor.com/q-a-with-inu-manak-on-wto-fisheries-subsidies-deal>.
30. “India Has Been Able to Secure Favourable Outcome at WTO After Many Years: Goyal,” *Indian Express*, June 17, 2022, <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-favourable-outcome-wto-goyal-7976044/>.
31. Manoj Kumar, “India to Oppose Curbs on Subsidies to Poor Fishermen at WTO Meet,” Reuters, January 25, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-oppose-curbs-subsidies-poor-fishermen-wto-meet-2024-01-25>.
32. Emma Farge and Rachna Uppal, “Where’s India? Key Holdout Country’s Minister Absent From WTO Meeting,” Reuters, February 26, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/india-urges-permanent-solution-public-food-stocks-wto-meeting-2024-02-26>.
33. General Council, Minutes of the Meeting (December 13–15, 2023), WT/GC/M/208, (paras. 18.122) <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/M208.pdf&Open=True>.
34. “Joint Statement on the United States-India Trade Policy Forum,” Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, January 12, 2024, <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/january/joint-statement-united-states-india-trade-policy-forum>; This was not the first instance where USTR’s priorities under the Joe Biden administration undermined the U.S. negotiating position at the WTO. In November 2023, the United States withdrew support for core provisions of the ecommerce talks. They are all provisions the United States long endorsed as part of digital trade talks, including the chapters it negotiated in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Although the plurilateral talks on ecommerce have stabilized, many issues remain unresolved. Critically, the question remains of how to incorporate the agreement into the WTO framework, as does some growing hesitation, given how hard it has been to get something as simple as the IFD across the finish line. See Inu Manak, “There’s Still Time to Reverse the U.S. About-Face on Digital Trade,” *The Hill*, November 10, 2023, <https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/4302029-theres-still-time-to-reverse-the-us-about-face-on-digital-trade>.
35. Members can reach consensus and have this incorporated into WTO rules through Annex 4 of the WTO agreements, because the ecommerce agreement discriminates and creates new rules, much like the Government Procurement Agreement.
36. “Certain Measures of India Providing Market Price Support to Rice and Wheat: Communication From Argentina, Australia, Canada, Ukraine, and the United States Pursuant to Article 18.7 of the Agreement on Agriculture,” World Trade Organization, G/AG/W/250, November 11, 2024, <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/G/AG/W250.pdf&Open=True>.

37. David Orden and Lars Brink, "Revising the WTO Measurement of Agricultural Price Support to Resolve the Impasse on Public Stockholding," *Trade, Law and Development* 14(2): 69-93, 2022; Former U.S. Department of Agriculture Chief Economist Joseph Glauber has also laid out a comprehensive list of suggested reforms. See Joseph Glauber, "Domestic Support Measures in the Context of Adaptation and Mitigation to Climate Change," Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2018, <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/e2c22698-0041-4eff-87ff-972be465de2c/content>; Joseph Glauber and Tanvi Sinha, "Procuring Food Stocks Under World Trade Organization Farm Subsidy Rules: Finding a Permanent Solution," International Institute for Sustainable Development, August, 2021, <https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2021-08/food-stocks-wto-farm-subsidy-rules.pdf>.