Assessing the Case for War in Afghanistan

Statement by
Dr. Stephen Biddle
Senior Fellow for Defense Policy
Council on Foreign Relations

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The war in Afghanistan had been nearly invisible to the public since 2001-2, but this is rapidly changing. In the process, basic questions have reemerged in a very different light than they assumed when this war began. What was once the “good war” to defeat a clear and present danger from a state that harbored al Qaeda has now become a much more ambiguous struggle to preserve a deeply flawed successor government from an insurgency allied with, but separate from, an al Qaeda that is now based across the border in Pakistan. Is this more complex conflict still worth waging?

The answer is a close call on the merits. The debate often treats Afghanistan in absolutes: it is either a graveyard of empires in which no outsider can succeed and a country where we have no meaningful interests at stake; or it is a war where victory can be assured if we show sufficient resolve and where only success can avert a direct threat of attack on the American homeland. In fact it is a harder call. This war is neither the obvious necessity that its strongest supporters claim, nor the clear loser that its opponents typically see. The war engages important, but indirect, U.S. interests. It will be expensive to wage properly, will require many years to resolve, and might ultimately fail even if waged vigorously, but failure is not guaranteed and the U.S. enjoys advantages that other outsiders in Afghanistan have not.

Most defense decisions are ultimately value judgments on how much risk we find tolerable and what price we are willing to pay to reduce a risk. The war in Afghanistan poses this problem more starkly than most given the scale of the costs and risks on both sides of the ledger here. Analysis can illuminate the costs and identify the risks, but especially in close calls it cannot predetermine value judgments on how much cost to bear and how much risk to accept. What the analysis shows here is that this ledger is close enough for reasonable people to differ. For me, the balance of cost and risk suggests a war that is worth waging, but only barely. What is clearest, however, is that neither the case for the war nor the case against it is beyond challenge or without important counterarguments.

I present this argument in four parts: the interests at stake; the war’s likely costs; the prospects for success in securing the interests if the costs are borne; and finally an assessment of the overall balance of cost and risk in light of this.
U.S. Interests at Stake in Afghanistan

The United States has many aspirations for Afghanistan, as we would for any country. Americans would like Afghanistan to be ruled in accordance with the will of the governed; we would like to see minority and women’s rights respected; we would like to see its youth educated and its people prosperous. But while we surely wish these things for any state, we do not ordinarily wage war to bring them about. The U.S. national security interests that might warrant war to achieve here are much narrower.

In fact, they are essentially twofold: that Afghanistan not become a base for terrorism against the United States, and that chaos in Afghanistan not destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan. Neither of these two primary security interests can be dismissed, but both have limits as casus belli.

The first interest is the most discussed – and the weakest argument for waging war. The United States invaded Afghanistan in the first place to destroy the al Qaeda safe haven there, and Afghanistan’s role in the 9-11 attacks clearly justified this. But al Qaeda central is no longer based in Afghanistan, nor has it been since early 2002. Bin Laden and his core operation are, by all accounts, now based across the border in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Taliban movement in Afghanistan is clearly linked with al Qaeda and sympathetic to it, but there is little evidence of al Qaeda infrastructure within Afghanistan today that could threaten the U.S. homeland in any direct way. If today’s Afghan government collapsed, if it were replaced with a neo-Taliban regime, or if the Taliban were able to secure real political control over some major contiguous fraction of Afghan territory then perhaps al Qaeda could re-establish a real haven there.

But this risk is shared with a wide range of other weak states in many parts of the world, from Yemen to Somalia to Djibouti to Eritrea to Sudan to the Philippines or even parts of Latin America or central, west, or North Africa, among other possibilities. And of course Iraq and Pakistan fit the description of weak states whose failure could provide havens for al Qaeda. Many of these – and especially Iraq and Pakistan – offer bin Laden prospects superior in important ways to Afghanistan’s. Iraq and Pakistan, for example, are richer and far better connected to the outside world than is primitive, land-locked Afghanistan with its minimal communications and transportation systems. Iraq is an Arab state in the very heart of the Middle East. Pakistan, of course, is a nuclear power. Afghanistan does enjoy a historical connection with al Qaeda, familiarity to bin Laden, and proximity to his current base in the FATA, and it is important to deny al Qaeda sanctuary on the Afghan side of the Durand Line. But its intrinsic importance is no greater than many other potential havens – and probably smaller than many. We clearly cannot afford to wage protracted warfare with multiple brigades of American ground forces simply to deny al Qaeda potential safe havens; we would run out of brigades long before bin Laden ran out of prospective sanctuaries.

The more important U.S. interest in Afghanistan is indirect: to prevent Afghan chaos from destabilizing its Pakistani neighbor. With a population of 173 million (five times Afghanistan’s), a GDP of over $160 billion (over ten times Afghanistan’s) and an actual, existing, functional nuclear arsenal of perhaps 20-50 warheads, Pakistan is a much more dangerous prospective state sanctuary for al Qaeda, and one where the likelihood of
government collapse enabling such a sanctuary may be in the same ballpark as Afghanistan, at least in the medium to long term. Pakistan is already at war with internal Islamist insurgents allied to al Qaeda, and by most measures that war is not going well. Should the Pakistani insurgency succeed in collapsing the state or toppling the government, the risk of nuclear weapons falling into al Qaeda’s hands would be grave indeed. In fact, given the difficulties terrorists face in acquiring usable nuclear weapons, Pakistani state collapse is the likeliest scenario for a nuclear-armed al Qaeda.

Pakistani state collapse, moreover, is a danger over which the United States has limited influence. The United States is now so unpopular in Pakistan that we have no meaningful prospect of deploying major ground forces there to assist the government in counterinsurgency. U.S. air strikes can harass insurgents and terrorists within Pakistan, but the inevitable collateral damage arouses harsh public opposition that could itself threaten the weak government’s stability. U.S. aid is easily – and routinely – diverted to purposes remote from countering Islamist insurgents, such as the maintenance of military counterweights to India, graft and patronage, or even support for Islamist groups seen by Pakistani authorities as potential allies against their Indian neighbor. U.S. assistance can – and should – be made conditional on progress in countering insurgents, but harsh conditionality can induce rejection of the terms, and the aid, by the Pakistanis, removing U.S. leverage in the process. The net result is a major threat over which Americans have very limited influence.

If the U.S. has few ways to make Pakistan any better, the best policy may be to invoke the Hippocratic Oath: at least do no harm. With so little actual leverage, the U.S. cannot afford to make the problem any worse than it already is. And failure in Afghanistan would make the problem in Pakistan much harder.

The Taliban are a transnational Pashtun movement that is active on either side of the Durand Line and sympathetic to other Pakistani Islamist insurgents. Their presence within Pakistan is thus already an important threat to the regime in Islamabad. But if the Taliban regained control of the Afghan state or even a major fraction of it, their ability to use even a poor state’s resources as a base to destabilize secular government in Pakistan would enable a major increase in the risk of state collapse there. Much has been made of the threat Pakistani base camps pose to Afghan government stability, but this danger works both ways: instability in Afghanistan poses a serious threat to secular civilian government in Pakistan. And this is the single greatest stake the United States has in Afghanistan: to prevent it from aggravating Pakistan’s internal problems and magnifying the danger of an al Qaeda nuclear sanctuary there.

These stakes are thus important. But they do not merit infinite cost to secure. Afghanistan is just one of many possible al Qaeda sanctuaries. And Afghanistan’s influence over Pakistan’s future is important, but incomplete and indirect. A Taliban Afghanistan is a real possibility in the long run absent U.S. action, and makes Pakistani collapse more likely, but it does not guarantee it. Nor would success in Afghanistan guarantee success in Pakistan: there is a chance that we could struggle our way to stability in Afghanistan at great cost and sacrifice only to see Pakistan collapse anyway under the weight of its own errors and internal divisions.
The Cost

What will it cost to defeat the Taliban? No one really knows; war is an uncertain business. But it is very hard to succeed at counterinsurgency (COIN) on the cheap. Current U.S. Army doctrine is very clear on this:

[MAintaining security in an unstable environment requires vast resources, whether host nation, U.S., or multinational. In contrast, a small number of highly motivated insurgents with simple weapons, good operations security, and even limited mobility can undermine security over a large area. Thus, successful COIN operations often require a high ratio of security forces to the protected population. For that reason, protracted COIN operations are hard to sustain. The effort requires a firm political will and substantial patience by the government, its people, and the countries providing support.]

Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources.

A proper analysis of troop requirements for Afghanistan is a more complex undertaking than can be provided here; GEN McChrystal’s staff is now producing such an assessment. But it is safe to say that most counterinsurgency theorists see COIN as an extremely labor-intensive form of warfare. In fact, the doctrinal norm for troop requirements in COIN is around one security provider per fifty civilians in the population to be secured. If one simply applies the doctrinal rule of thumb to Afghanistan, a state of roughly 32 million people, this crude yardstick would imply a need for perhaps 640,000 trained soldiers and police. Many argue that the doctrinal density need not be maintained across the entire country; it is widely believed, for example, that the north and west of the country are safer than the south and east. And of course a sound estimate of resource needs would require a much more discriminating mapping of troop needs to specific tasks in specific places. But it is clear that COIN in a country the size of Afghanistan can be very demanding of resources. Ideally most of these security forces would be indigenous Afghans rather than foreign troops. But some will clearly have to be Americans and other foreigners. And the commitment could be very long: successful counterinsurgency campaigns commonly last ten to fifteen years or more.

At least initially, the casualties to be expected from such an effort would also be heavy. In Iraq, a force of 130,000-160,000 U.S. troops averaged over 90 fatalities per month during the most intense period of COIN operations in January to August of 2007. Depending on the troop strength ultimately deployed and the intensity of the fighting, it is not implausible to suppose that casualty rates in Afghanistan could approach such levels. And it may well take longer for those losses to reverse and decline in Afghanistan than in

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2 Ibid., p. 43.

3 Ibid., p. 23.

Iraq; it would be prudent to assume that fatality rates in excess of 50 per month could persist for many months, if not years.\footnote{The financial costs are also likely to be large. The Congressional Research Service estimates that the war in Afghanistan cost $34 billion in FY 2008, and projects that this figure will increase in coming years: Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 15, 2008), RL33110, pp. 6, 19.}

**The Odds of Success**


The political scientists Jason Lyall of Princeton and Isaiah Wilson of West Point estimate that since 1975, the success rate of all government counterinsurgents has been just 25 percent.\footnote{Given the costs of trying, this average offers a sobering context.}

Nor are current conditions in Afghanistan encouraging. Orthodox COIN theory puts host government legitimacy at the heart of success and failure, yet the Karzai government is widely seen as corrupt, inept, inefficient, and en route to losing the support of its population. The recent election’s results are not yet clear, but widely reported electoral fraud could easily reduce Karzai’s perceived legitimacy if he is ultimately declared the winner of a disputed contest. Economic and political development prospects are constrained by Afghanistan’s forbidding geography, tribal social structure, lack of infrastructure, and political history. The Taliban enjoy a cross-border sanctuary in the FATA that the Pakistani government seems unwilling or unable to eliminate. Violence is up, perceptions of security are down, casualties are increasing, and the Taliban is widely believed to be increasing its freedom of movement and access to the population. And only some of these challenges are things Americans can affect directly: the United States can increase security by deploying more U.S. troops, it can bolster the economy to a degree with U.S. economic aid, and it can pressure Karzai to reform, but only the Afghans can create a legitimate government, and only the Pakistanis can shut down the safe havens in the FATA. Americans can influence these choices to a much greater degree than we have so far. But the United States cannot itself guarantee Afghan reform, and to date neither ally seems ready to do what it takes.

But this does not make failure inevitable. The poor track record for COIN overall is due partly to the inherent difficulty of the undertaking, but most analysts also believe that many counterinsurgents have made poor strategic choices, and that these poor choices have been major contributors to failure. Strategies and methods can be changed – it is possible to learn from experience. And the U.S. military has learned a great deal about COIN in recent years.

The new Army/Marine counterinsurgency doctrine, for example, is the product of a nearly unprecedented degree of internal debate, external vetting, historical analysis, and
direct recent combat experience. None of this makes it a magic silver bullet for COIN success, and in important ways it makes underlying assumptions about the nature of counterinsurgency that made it an awkward fit for conditions in Iraq. But those same assumptions make it a much stronger fit for Afghanistan, which is precisely the kind of war the manual was built around. And there is some, albeit preliminary, empirical evidence to suggest that the new doctrine’s emphasis on population security as opposed to insurgent attrition has been substantially more successful historically than more-violent, attrition-oriented strategies: Andrew Enterline and Joseph Magagnoli, for example, estimate that since World War II, COIN strategies emphasizing population security over insurgent attrition have succeeded almost 70 percent of the time.

One of the doctrine’s remaining shortcomings, moreover, is a problem the Obama Administration seems likely to address. The published doctrine assumes a very close alignment of interests between the United States and its host government: the manual assumes that the U.S. role is to enable the host to realize its own best interest by making itself into a legitimate defender of all its citizens’ wellbeing, and that the host will see it this way, too. In many ways, the Bush Administration shared this view, offering assistance with few conditions or strings on the assumption that developing its allies’ capacity for good governance was all that would be needed to realize better performance. In fact, though, many allies – notably including Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf, have had much more complex interests that have led them to misdirect U.S. aid and fall far short of U.S. hopes for their popular legitimacy. Some students of counterinsurgency have thus emphasized the need for conditionality in outside assistance to reduce this problem of moral hazard: the U.S. should not assume that allies share all its interests, and Americans should impose conditions, and combine carrots with sticks in order to push reluctant hosts toward behavior that could better realize U.S. interests in their broader legitimacy and thereby damp insurgencies. The Obama Administration has made it very clear that they intend to combine bigger carrots with real sticks in the form of prospective aid withdrawals should the recipients fail to adopt needed reforms. This is an important step forward in competing for hearts and minds via effective host governance.

The U.S. military forces that implement this doctrine are also much improved over their ancestors in Vietnam, or even their immediate predecessors in Iraq in 2003-4 – and

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8 In particular, the doctrine presumes an ideological struggle for the allegiance of an uncommitted public, rather than a highly mobilized ethno-sectarian war of identity, as Iraq has been: for details, see Jeffrey Isaac, editor, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2008), pp. 347-50 at 349-50.


10 See, for example, U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, pp. 7-8, 25, 35, 37-39, 47 (e.g., paragraph 1-147: “Support the Host Nation”).

11 For a more extensive discussion, see, esp., Daniel Byman, "Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism," International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 79-115.
they are vastly superior in training, equipment, and doctrine to the Soviet military that failed in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Soviet methods in the 1980s made lavish use of indiscriminate firepower that created enemies much faster than it killed insurgents. Soviet troops, moreover, were so poorly trained and motivated that their commanders were often forced to use elite commando units to carry out routine missions; regular Soviet infantry often could not be relied upon to do much more than passive garrison duty. And Soviet equipment was almost entirely designed for major warfare against NATO in central Europe – the Soviets never made a systematic decision to re-equip for counterinsurgency.\(^\text{12}\) By contrast, the U.S. military of 2009 has adapted into an unusually proficient counterinsurgency force. It did not begin the war this way, but hard experience in Iraq, coupled with an almost preclusive training emphasis on COIN since the early years of the Iraq war, a new doctrine with a heavy focus on the population-defense methods that have proven most effective historically, and systematic re-equipment with new mine-resistant armored vehicles and other ground-force equipment designed for counterinsurgency has produced a vastly more effective military for this mission than the Soviets ever fielded.

Perhaps most important, the United States is blessed with deeply flawed enemies in Afghanistan. Afghans know the Taliban; they know what life was like under their rule. And polling has consistently suggested that few Afghans want to return to the medieval theocracy they endured before. Most Afghans want education for their daughters; they want access to media and ideas from abroad; they want freedom from thugs enforcing fundamentalism for all under the aegis of a Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. Of course, these preferences are secondary to the need for security. And many are secondary to the desire for basic services such as courts free of corruption or police who enforce the laws without demanding bribes first. But because most Afghans oppose Taliban rule, the United States and its allies enjoy a strong presumption in favor of the Afghan government as long as that government can be made to provide at least basic services competently. The Taliban face an inherently uphill battle to secure compliance with their policies that even a modestly proficient government does not. And in a struggle for hearts and minds this is an important advantage.

The Taliban, moreover, are far from a unified opposition group. In fact, to refer to the opposition in Afghanistan via a singular noun is in many ways a misnomer. By contrast with the Viet Cong of 1964, for example, where a common ideology bound the leadership together and linked it to its fighters, the neo-Taliban of 2009 are a much looser, much more heterogeneous, much more divided coalition of often fractious and very independent actors. There is a hard core of committed Islamist ideologues, centered on Mullah Omar and based in Quetta. But by all accounts much of the Taliban’s actual combat strength is provided by an array of warlords and other factions with often much more secular motivations, who side with the Taliban for reasons of profit, prestige, or convenience, and who may or may not follow orders from the Quetta Shura leadership. Americans often lament the challenges to unity of effort that flow from a divided NATO command structure, but the Taliban face difficulties on this score at least as severe and

potentially much worse: no NATO member is going to change sides and fight for the Taliban, but the Taliban need to be constantly alert lest one or more of their component factions leave the alliance for the government side. And this makes it difficult for the Taliban to mount large-scale, coordinated offensives of the kind that would be needed to conquer a defended city, for example – such efforts would be hard for any one faction or any one commander to accomplish without closely-coordinated assistance from others, yet such coordination can be hard to achieve in such a decentralized, factionalized leadership structure.

The Taliban also face major constraints in extending their influence beyond their ethnic base in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban is an overwhelmingly Pashtun movement. Yet Pashtuns make up less than 45 percent of Afghanistan’s population overall, and constitute only a small fraction of the population outside the south and east. Afghanistan is not primarily an ethno-sectarian war of identity, as Iraq has been – most Taliban are Pashtuns, but most Pashtuns are not Taliban (in fact the government is itself headed by a Pashtun in President Hamid Karzai). Afghanistan is a war fought over the Taliban’s ideology for governing, not the hope for a Pashtun government. But whereas the government has members from many ethnic groups and a presumptive claim to the loyalty of all citizens, the Taliban has a much more exclusivist identity and is especially unpopular and unwelcome outside its geographic ethnic base. This in turn will make it harder for them to conquer the north and west of the country, and acts as a limiter on their expansion in the near term. This is not to say that the north or west of Afghanistan are permanently or inherently secure; on the contrary, recent trends there are worrisome, and even these parts of the country will eventually require attention to stabilize. But the Taliban’s Pashtun ethnic identity makes it harder for them to expand out of the south and east, and this in turn buys time and reduces resource requirements for effective counterinsurgency nationally. (It is worth noting that even in their first rule, the Taliban never completely secured the north – it was the unconquered “Northern Alliance”’s hold over contiguous territory in that part of Afghanistan that provided allies, a base, and a jump-off point for the American Special Forces who teamed with them to topple the Taliban in 2001.)

Finally, by all accounts the enemy in Afghanistan today is much less numerous than that faced by the Soviets, for example, in the late 1980s. Intelligence estimates on insurgents’ order of battle are always imprecise and uncertain. But most sources suggest that the Mujaheddin opposing the Soviets by the late 1980s numbered around 150,000 armed combatants.13 After 1986, these guerillas were also equipped with increasingly sophisticated Western-supplied arms, and especially shoulder-fired precision guided anti-aircraft missiles. By contrast, the Taliban today are usually assessed at a strength of 20-40,000 fighters, of whom only around one-fourth are full time combatants, and who have to date deployed little or no precision weaponry.14


necessarily the most important variable in COIN, but against the commonplace assumption that the Soviet experience will be America’s fate in Afghanistan, we must keep in mind that the situation the United States faces is less dire in important respects — including the strength of the insurgent enemy.

**Assessment**

Withdrawal advocates certainly have a case. The stakes are not unlimited. The costs of pursuing them are high. And there is no guarantee that even a high-cost pursuit of COIN in Afghanistan will succeed given the inherent difficulties of the undertaking and the particular challenges of this theater in 2009.

But while success is not guaranteed, neither is failure. Some governments succeed in COIN, and the familiar comparisons of today with the Soviets in Afghanistan or the United States in Vietnam pit apples against oranges: in 2009, the U.S. military is much more proficient, and the Taliban insurgency much less so, than their forebears. Great powers do not always fail in COIN; the U.S. is an unusually experienced counterinsurgent force today; the Taliban have serious problems of their own; and astute strategic choices can make an important difference. This combination gives the United States an important possibility for successful counterinsurgency.

Moreover, U.S. withdrawal poses important risks, too — and especially, it could easily cause an Afghan government collapse with potentially serious consequences for U.S. security. The Taliban’s weaknesses make it hard for them to overthrow a U.S. supported government while large Western military forces defend it. But without those Western troops, the Afghan state would offer a much easier target. Even with over 50,000 Western troops in its defense, the Karzai government has proven unable to contain Taliban influence and prevent insurgents from expanding their presence; if abandoned to its fate the government would surely fare much worse. Nor would an orphaned Karzai regime be in any position to negotiate a compromise settlement that could deny the Taliban full control: with outright victory within their grasp, it is hard to see why the Taliban would settle for anything less than a complete restoration.

A Taliban restoration would put the resources of a state at their disposal. Even the resources of a weak state would enable a major increase in funding, freedom of operation, training opportunities, planning capacity, recruitment potential, and military staging, refitting, reconstitution and resupply for cross-border operations. The result could afford al Qaeda with an improved sanctuary for attacking the United States. But even if it did not, it would almost certainly afford Pashtun militants and their allies in Pakistan with a massive sanctuary for destabilizing the regime in Islamabad, and thereby create a major increase in the threat to the Pakistani government and the security of its nuclear arsenal. Even without a state haven in Afghanistan, Pakistani insurgents might ultimately topple the government in Islamabad, but with the additional resources of an openly sympathetic state across the Durand Line this threat is even more dangerous. And this threat constitutes one of the few really plausible pathways by which al Qaeda could obtain a useable nuclear weapon.

This danger is real, but it is not unlimited and should not be exaggerated. For a U.S. withdrawal to result in a nuclear al Qaeda would require a chain of multiple intervening
events: a Taliban restoration in Kabul, collapse of secular government in Islamabad, and loss of control over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal (or deliberate transfer of weapons by sympathetic Pakistanis). None of these events are certainties, and the compound probability is inherently lower than the odds of any one step taken alone. Though these odds are hard to estimate, analysts such as John Mueller make a persuasive case that terrorists are more likely to fail in their efforts to obtain nuclear weapons than they are to succeed, and the series of setbacks needed for a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan to yield a usable al Qaeda nuclear capability probably implies a compound likelihood that is low in absolute terms.¹⁵

But U.S. withdrawal increases all the probabilities at each stage. And the consequences for U.S. security if the chain does play itself out are very severe. Unlike the Soviet Union in the Cold War (or even contemporary states such as Iran), al Qaeda may be much less susceptible to deterrence, and considerably more likely to use a nuclear weapon if they acquire it. One need not accept “one percent doctrines” or other extremist versions of nuclear threat-mongering to be concerned with the consequences of a potential al Qaeda nuclear capability.¹⁶ Nor does it resolve the issue simply to find that al Qaeda is “unlikely” to acquire nuclear weapons even if the Karzai government falls. When the stakes are high, even low probabilities of true disasters can be too high to accept: most Americans buy life insurance in a society in which the risk of death in a given year is less than one half of one percent for 45-54 year olds; it is clearly not unreasonable to consider accepting costs to address low-probability events.¹⁷ If a nuclear al Qaeda were impossible or virtually so, then the prospect could simply be ignored. But otherwise the issue inevitably comes back to a difficult value judgment on risk tolerance. This is not a new problem. After all, a central feature of U.S. security policy throughout the Cold War was America’s willingness to expend large resources to reduce the odds of unlikely events: a Soviet bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike was surely never very likely, but the consequences if it ever did happen would have been so severe that the nation accepted huge costs to reduce the odds of such a disaster from low to very low. Americans have long debated whether this judgment was wise. But there is considerable precedent for American governments, of both parties, displaying enough concern with unlikely but dangerous scenarios to expend great effort to reduce the odds.


¹⁶ See Ron Susskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006). Susskind argues that Vice President Cheney held that any risk of a nuclear attack greater than one percent should be treated as a certainty for purposes of U.S. policy.

The net result is thus a difficult value judgment between unattractive alternatives, rather than a clear cut, open-and-shut case on analytical grounds. In this context, analysis can exclude certain popular but overstated positions: in fact, COIN in Afghanistan is not hopeless; the United States is not without important interests in the conflict; to secure these interests does not require a modern, centralized, Westernized Switzerland of the Hindu Kush; conversely, success is not guaranteed if only we are resolute; U.S. interests in Afghanistan are not unlimited; and the most important U.S. interests in the conflict are indirect and concern Pakistan more than Afghanistan per se. Analysis can also establish that the likely costs of pursuing COIN success will be high, and it can illuminate the causal pathways by which different outcomes can affect U.S. interests in general, or the danger of a nuclear al Qaeda in particular. But with important costs and risks on both sides of the ledger, the answer for how much cost is worth bearing for what reduction in risk is ultimately a value judgment rather than an analytical finding. This is not a judgment on the value of American lives or the moral worthiness of sacrifice or resolve. Either course here involves risks to American lives – a choice to withdraw is neither more nor less humanitarian, neither more nor less respectful of sacrifice or service or others’ suffering, than the opposite. Rather, the judgment here is between accepting greater casualties and sacrifices in the nearer term to reduce some probability of higher casualties and sacrifices in the longer term. For me, this balance is a close call but ultimately favors the waging of war in Afghanistan. But reasonable people can differ on such judgments. Perhaps the most important conclusion is instead that the choice is unavoidably hard: what analysis can show is that there is no course open to us that is without important downsides – there is no easy way out of Afghanistan for the United States in 2009.