

Freedom, Prosperity, and Security

The G8 Partnership with Africa: Sea Island 2004 and Beyond

A Council on Foreign Relations Special Report

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FOREWORD

The United States hosts the summit of the G8 group of advanced industrialized countries this year at Sea Island, Georgia. At the past three summits, G8 leaders gave special attention to Africa. To help make sure this emphasis is maintained, the Council on Foreign Relations established the G8-Africa Partnership Project under the auspices of the Africa Policy Studies Program. The project, which is directed by Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow Princeton N. Lyman, was conducted in collaboration with the Royal Institute for International Affairs, Chatham House, in the United Kingdom. A roundtable of experts, co-chaired by J. Brian Atwood and Robert S. Browne, was organized to examine the commitments made at the G8 meetings at Kananaskis in 2002 and Evian in 2003 under the Africa Action Plan (AAP) and to assess progress toward achieving them. Papers were commissioned on major elements of the AAP. The roundtable held meetings in Washington, DC, New York City, and London to deliberate these matters. The lists of participants and papers prepared for these meetings are provided in the appendixes.

The project report is framed by the decision of the United States to focus the Sea Island summit around three themes: freedom, prosperity, and security. It evaluates African and G8 performance in light of past commitments in the AAP that fit into these three areas and highlights issues that require further attention. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining Africa on the G8 agenda to avoid any downgrading of the G8-Africa commitments of the last two years.

The Council on Foreign Relations is grateful to the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and to Citigroup for support of this project.

Richard N. Haass
President
Council on Foreign Relations

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Several of our colleagues at the Council on Foreign Relations made this project possible. Richard N. Haass, James M. Lindsay, and Lee A. Feinstein contributed valuable insights to the report. Patricia Dorff and Jennifer Anmuth were helpful and efficient in publishing the report.

Alex Vines, director of the Africa Program at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, Chatham House, graciously hosted two meetings in London on the G8-Africa Partnership.

I would also like to thank Kwaku Nuamah, the principal drafter of this report, who did a wonderful job of listening to the perspectives of all our experts. Odette Boya was the overall coordinator of our meetings and made excellent editorial contributions to this report.

Finally, I want to join Richard Haass in thanking the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and Citigroup for their support of our project.

Princeton N. Lyman
Project Director

INTRODUCTION

The United States will host the G8 Summit at Sea Island, Georgia, in June 2004. Many urgent and critical international issues need to be discussed at the summit, especially developments in the Middle East and in the worldwide war on terrorism. It will be important, however, that the summit also maintain the momentum of the past three years in the G8-Africa partnership. This will reinforce the work of African leaders who are championing democracy, human rights, and good governance. Africa, moreover, figures prominently in the three global issues the United States has selected for the summit: freedom, security, and prosperity.

It now appears that the United States will invite a group of African leaders to confer with the G8, following the practice of the last three years. The United States is also proposing that the G8 address several items that bear on Africa at the summit, including food security, transparency in the oil and mineral sectors, peace support, and debt relief for post-conflict countries. These items do not encompass the breadth of issues in the G8's Africa Action Plan (AAP), described below, however, nor do they substitute for commitment to the long-term overall partnership that has been at the heart of the G8-Africa relationship in the past three years.

The U.S. decision to invite African leaders is a good step in this direction. Symbolically, it sends the message that African issues remain high on the G8 agenda. Substantively, it allows African leaders to speak directly with the G8 members on issues of peace and security, trade, and democracy. The United States should go further and specifically incorporate African issues into the G8 discussion of the three themes of the summit. It should also reiterate the G8 commitment to the AAP and to a full review of it at the next G8 Summit, to be held in the United Kingdom in 2005.

The G8's special attention to Africa has been warranted by the particular problems Africa poses for the international community. Africa's marginalization and persistent widespread poverty represent a major moral responsibility for the wealthy countries. Africa remains basically outside the global trading and investment system. At the end of the 1990s, a decade of globalization in finance and trade, sub-Saharan Africa still accounted for less than 2 percent of world trade and received less than 1 percent of

global capital flows.¹ A majority of the least-developed countries are in Africa, and even once “middle-income” countries such as Nigeria have suffered severe declines in per capita gross national product in the last fifteen years. Finally, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has hit sub-Saharan Africa hardest of any region. Some 3.2 million children, of whom approximately 90 percent reside in sub-Saharan Africa, are living with HIV/AIDS.² With nearly thirty million people infected and more than ten million orphaned by the disease, the continent faces a potential catastrophe unless major action is taken.

Africa affects the G8’s global interests in security. Conflicts in Africa, such as those in Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), have created enormous humanitarian crises and strained international peacekeeping capacities. G8 members—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have each had to deploy peacekeeping troops to the continent in the past three years. UN peacekeeping costs in Africa, meanwhile, have driven the UN budget for this purpose to nearly \$4 billion, posing serious budget problems for G8 members. Finally, in this milieu of conflict and weak governments, terrorist cells were able to develop that led to the bombings of American and Israeli facilities in East Africa—in which thousands of Africans died—and to the growth of illegal financial and arms-trading activities elsewhere on the continent.

Africa’s poverty, marginalization, and security all impinge on the well-being and security of the G8 countries. As a recent Independent Task Force report of the Council on Foreign Relations stated,

Democratic federalism can hardly be expected to flourish when people lack the capacity to feed, clothe, house, and otherwise sustain themselves. ... *Americans and Europeans cannot enjoy these privileges in an interconnected world without encouraging their diffusion elsewhere.* The architects of the Marshall Plan knew that without recovery there could be neither security nor law within Europe. The beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan—who include both Europeans and Americans—have every reason to understand that this principle applies today throughout the world.³

The G8-Africa Partnership, begun in 2001, reflects these concerns. It is still at an early stage. As this report will document, both Africans and G8 members have made

¹ “A Ten-Year Strategy for Increasing Capital Flows to Africa,” *A Report of the Commission on Capital Flows to Africa*, June 2003.

² See chart at http://www.globalhealth.org/view_top.php3?id=226.

³ *Renewing the Atlantic Partnership*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2004. Full text available at <http://www.cfr.org>.

progress in meeting their commitments under the AAP. But implementation of most programs is just getting under way. African commitments to improved governance and economic reform remain tenuous in a number of countries. And for the G8, in areas such as trade, security assistance, and debt relief, much greater effort is needed. Thus strong political impetus from the G8 leaders is essential to maintaining momentum and reinforcing commitments.

The United States, as host and in setting the agenda of the meeting, is in a particularly strong position to achieve this momentum at Sea Island. There are many other issues on the U.S. agenda: the Middle East, worldwide terrorism, economic growth, and trade. But in the ways described above—inviting African leaders, incorporating Africa within the three themes of the meeting, and reiterating commitment to the AAP—the United States will lay the foundation for further progress on the AAP in the coming year and for a full summit review of it in 2005.

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE AFRICA PARTNERSHIP

The United States would derive particular advantage from maintaining a strong G8 focus on Africa at the U.S.-hosted summit. Africa has relevance for all three global themes selected for the G8 meeting by the United States. Furthermore, the United States can showcase a strong record of achievement in relation to the G8's AAP, a record with which to mobilize greater effort from its G8 partners.

Security concerns are becoming especially important in Africa. As President George W. Bush recognized during his trip to Africa last July, al-Qaeda has already infiltrated Africa and carried out several terrorist attacks on American, Israeli, and African establishments. The president's \$100 million commitment for antiterrorism programs in East Africa is testimony to the importance of this threat. In the past few months, American military advisers and logistical assistance have been provided to African states in the Sahel region of West Africa to chase down and destroy terrorist operatives coming out of Algeria. The threat should engage America's G8 partners. The deputy commander of the U.S. European Command, General Charles Wald, recently told a gathering in Washington, "Terrorists training in the Sahel can be in the United States or Europe in a matter of hours."

With regard to prosperity, Africa, home to 40 out of the 147 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), plays a significant role in the Doha round, the current multilateral trade negotiations actively promoted by the United States. African support was key to U.S. success in initiating the Doha round in 2001. The African caucus was equally critical, however, along with other developing countries, in the failure to reach agreement at the last meeting in the round at Cancún, when the U.S. and European offers on agricultural subsidies were deemed insufficient. The G8's reiteration of its commitment in the AAP to promoting African trade and development will be important in maintaining a constructive tone in these negotiations and progress toward a final agreement.

Africa is also fast emerging as a significant supplier of U.S. energy needs and a major contributor to the worldwide diversity of supply. Central and West Africa will account for one in four new barrels of oil to come on the global market in the next five

years.⁴ Reports estimate that the region could supply up to 20 percent or more of U.S. imported oil in the next ten years. Natural gas from Africa could become equally important as liquefied natural gas facilities are further developed in Nigeria and elsewhere along the West African coast.

Finally, as detailed below, Africa has been moving steadily toward greater democracy across the continent. Several nations in Africa—Senegal, Mali, and Niger—provide examples of democracy in Muslim countries, a subject of major interest to the United States elsewhere in the Muslim world. Two primarily Muslim countries—Senegal and Mauritania—and Nigeria, with more than sixty-five million Muslims, have diplomatic relations with Israel, providing an example of outreach across the barrier to acceptance of Israel in the Islamic world. Countries experiencing religious tension between Muslims and Christians, as in Nigeria, bear watching in terms of the possible exploitation of these differences by extremist elements.

⁴ E. Ebel and D. L. Goldwyn, “Crafting a U.S. Energy Policy for Africa,” *Report of the Africa Policy Advisory Panel*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2004.

EVALUATING AFRICAN PERFORMANCE

Africa's plight is a matter for global concern. Abysmal economic growth rates and intractable webs of conflict, famine, and disease have contributed to falling standards of living for millions of Africans at a period when unprecedented advances in science and technology are fueling growth in most societies elsewhere. Yet several African success stories in the recent past should serve as a basis of optimism. With particular reference to the AAP, African states have taken several steps to strengthen governance, economic development, and their capacity for conflict resolution.

The Organization of African Unity, formed in 1963 largely as a political body to advance the cause of independence in Africa, has been transformed into the African Union (AU), an organization more focused on governance, peacemaking, and economic development. The AU has established an African Parliament and agreed on a peace and security organ. Under the leadership of Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Africans also developed the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which has been formally adopted by the AU. NEPAD sets forth specific objectives for governance, human rights, sound economic policies, subregional economic cooperation, and the basis for trade and aid partnership with the international community. NEPAD was first presented to the G8 at Genoa in 2001, where it received strong endorsement. NEPAD subsequently provided the basis for African commitments under the AAP.

African fulfillment of its commitments has been mixed. In most cases, the commitments are of such a long-term character that they cannot be fully evaluated. A key element of NEPAD, and the one that perhaps has attracted the most attention, is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). African countries that agree to the APRM procedure will be evaluated by a group of experts on their commitment to and implementation of NEPAD objectives. In July 2003, the African Peer Review Panel was inaugurated. Since then it has established rules and procedures, a work program and budget, a provisional list of partner institutions, guidelines for countries participating in the review process, and a set of questions for countries to answer in the four thematic areas of the APRM: democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socioeconomic development. So far nineteen out

of fifty-three members of the AU have volunteered for such review. The first review began in Ghana in April 2004 to be followed by reviews in Kenya, Mauritius, and Rwanda.

It is too early to judge the quality of the review process, its influence on those countries reviewed, or whether more African countries will agree to participate. The AU and NEPAD come under severe criticism in some quarters, moreover, for not addressing effectively the deteriorating political and human rights situation in Zimbabwe, where seemingly every NEPAD principle is being violated. Africans respond that NEPAD should be judged not by the immediate case of Zimbabwe but rather as a building-block process, and by progress over time toward full adherence to its basic principles.

While not reversing the negative developments in Zimbabwe, African leaders have moved quickly to reverse coups against elected leaders in smaller countries. Over the last two years, coups were reversed in Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe after intervention by the leaders of Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal. South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Angola helped thwart an attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea by foreign mercenaries. Moreover, the AU has adopted several measures to discourage the unconstitutional overthrow of elected leaders. At its 1999 Algiers meeting, the AU pledged to bar governments that seized power in coups d'état from future summits. This was reinforced at Lomé in 2000 with a decision to proscribe cooperation with coup plotters on the continent.

NEPAD commitments in such fields as agriculture, health, and the environment are similarly in early stages of implementation. General plans and commitments have been formulated in each field, but little exists yet to judge. For example, African countries have committed to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program, which sets priorities and calls for African countries to allocate at least 10 percent of national budgetary resources to agriculture within five years. Many African countries, however, will not meet even this modest commitment in the time frame proposed. African countries have committed to spend 15 percent of their budgets on health. There again, the results are mixed. More concrete progress has been achieved in infrastructure development. NEPAD's action plan in this field was developed in conjunction with the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the European

Development Fund. The World Bank has approved funding for two of the projects: the Southern Africa power market and the Southern Africa regional gas project.

NEPAD looks to the G8 and developed countries for both debt relief and additional assistance to help it meet its development goals. The assistance target is for \$64 billion in additional assistance per year, more than triple current levels, to jump-start economic growth. Some believe that planning on such increases is unrealistic and serves to distort priorities and divert attention from more likely and practical programming. African leaders argue that this represents a logical framework and realistic allocation of responsibilities. Most of the responsibility for development rests with Africa, but at no time in history, they argue, could such a vast program of development as needed in Africa—in essence, meeting the UN's Millennium Development Goals of halving poverty by 2015—be achieved without significant outside help. Africa's poverty is especially relevant in this regard.

On conflict resolution, Africa has taken strong initiatives with concrete results. South Africa has played the leading role, in conjunction with other concerned African countries, in ending a war in the DRC that cost four million lives. This extremely complex peace process involved negotiating the withdrawal of troops from several neighboring African countries, the cessation of armed conflict among competing internal forces, and the establishment of a coalition government. South Africa also contributed emergency troops, along with troops from Europe, to stop massacres in the northeastern part of the country when UN peacekeepers were unable to do so. South Africa also has led the peacemaking effort in Burundi, where a Rwanda-like ethnic explosion threatened. The AU has sent a peacekeeping mission to Burundi, drawn from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa, and is seeking UN support for a broader peacekeeping effort. Kenya plays an important role in the negotiations to end the civil war in Sudan, and to find a solution to the failed state of Somalia. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) played the principal political role in engineering the departure of President Charles Taylor, essential to ending the civil war in Liberia, and the formation of an interim administration. ECOWAS then provided several thousand peacekeepers in advance of a UN force in Liberia.

In sum, Africa has made progress on the institutional aspects of NEPAD and on fairly specific plans to achieve its development objectives. Implementation in these areas remains to be judged over time. Africa has played a major role in bringing about an end

to some of the devastating conflicts on the continent. African countries have been willing to commit peacekeepers in several situations ahead of broader international involvement and support. African leaders have also acted quickly to reverse some efforts to unseat democratically elected governments.

EVALUATING G8 PERFORMANCE ON ITS AFRICA ACTION PLAN PLEDGES

The following assessment does not cover the entirety of the G8's Africa Action Plan, which has 132 specific, concrete, future-oriented commitments. Rather, it focuses on those commitments that correspond most closely to the three themes the United States has selected for the summit: freedom, prosperity, and security. It is designed to provide the basis for incorporating Africa into the discussion of these themes at Sea Island.

The assessment is also necessarily preliminary. The AAP is only two years old. Most of the steps taken to date are commitments of resources or other initiatives. Their effectiveness and impact cannot be assessed yet. We can, however, get a picture of the response by the G8 members and whether it begins to match the problems the AAP is designed to address.

PROMOTING FREEDOM

The G8 partners have made several important pledges in support of good governance and institutional reform in Africa. Weak institutions and a checkered commitment to democracy and accountable governance were major obstacles to economic growth and sociopolitical development in the first three decades of independent statehood. With the proclamation of NEPAD, African leaders signaled their intention to chart a new course toward prosperity and freedom with the help of external partners. They enshrined good governance and accountability as essential elements of NEPAD and invited G8 assistance in pursuing its goals. The G8 partners' response was overwhelmingly positive. The AAP pledged support for NEPAD's democracy and good governance objectives. It also promised support for anti-corruption efforts, respect for human rights, and policies that promote gender equality and empower women. Even more significant, the G8 also pledged support for the APRM, the principal device adopted by the African leaders to assess progress and encourage the kinds of reforms needed to sustain democracy and good governance on the continent.

What Has Been Done?

Bilaterally and collectively, the G8 countries have made significant efforts to fulfill these pledges. On the bilateral front, the United States, for instance, has contributed substantial

funds and technical expertise to support programs that enhance transparency and good governance on the continent. Washington, for example, launched the Africa Anti-Corruption Initiative to support indigenous anti-corruption efforts on the continent. The initiative, which is budgeted at \$36 million over five years, will strengthen institutions of accountable governance by assisting reforming African states in combating public- and private-sector corruption and helping establish best practices for improving transparency and accountability.⁵ Furthermore, the Bush administration, as a sign of its commitments to democracy worldwide, made good governance and accountability the central yardsticks for disbursements from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The MCA, which will draw a budget of \$1.3 billion in new money for fiscal year (FY) 2004 and is expected to total \$5 billion in FY 2006, rewards countries that demonstrate a commitment to “ruling justly, investing in people, and establishing economic freedom.” Eight African states—Senegal, Mali, Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Madagascar—have been selected in the first year to submit proposals under this new fund.

The Canadian government has launched the \$500 million Canada Fund for Africa (CFA) to complement its development initiatives for Africa, which are expected to total more than \$6 billion over the next five years. Fifteen percent of this funding is directed toward governance, peace, and security programming.⁶ The CFA has facilitated the sharing of African and Canadian skills and knowledge on public-service reform and decentralization, two major steps in enhancing the effectiveness of local government structures on the continent. In addition, Ottawa is working with such partners as the African Union of Local Authorities and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities to explore new ways of providing basic services in needy communities. One \$6 million project will help improve local governments’ capacity to deliver amenities such as water, sanitation, and health services to the poor. Ottawa has also earmarked new funding for governance-related projects that enhance the work of parliaments, enhance public-sector governance, and promote gender equality. For example, \$9 million has been earmarked for improving the capacity of African legislatures as effective forums of representation.

⁵ See document at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/initiatives/anti_corruption.html.

⁶ See document at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/canadafundforafrica>.

Another \$28 million has been committed to improving public-sector governance and transparency through the African Capacity-Building Foundation.

In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair has made good governance in Africa a core priority in international development assistance. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has focused particularly on strengthening regional institutions such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) as a way of enhancing the role of such institutions in promoting good governance on the continent. The ECA, for instance, has become a major provider of technical and analytical support to the NEPAD process and currently publishes the *African Governance Report*—a comprehensive assessment of governance in Africa countries. The UK government also funds several initiatives dedicated to fighting corruption in countries such as Sierra Leone, Malawi, Uganda, Nigeria, Zambia, and Mozambique. It has also provided active support for the work of the East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. In addition to being welcomed by many G8 governments and the World Bank, the latter initiative has received the support of a growing number of African governments, including those of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and the DRC.

Other G8 partners, particularly Germany, have also devoted significant levels of their development assistance budgets to projects that enhance democracy, human rights, and freedoms in Africa. The German government has cited as a top priority in its external development strategy the promotion of good governance, women's empowerment, and respect for human rights in Africa. Funding for projects in these areas has been channeled through direct government assistance and various German *Stiftungen* (political party foundations) currently operating in Africa.

More modest contributions have also come from Italy and France. Italy currently funds a triennial conference involving the chairmen of African parliaments and has allotted €4 million toward strengthening parliamentary institutions in Africa.

France appears willing to broaden the scope of its development assistance to include democracy-related issues and has already provided some assistance toward projects dedicated to judicial and parliamentary reform, improving public administration via decentralization, and strengthening the role of Africa's news media as agents of democracy. Democratization and human rights have also emerged as important aspects of Japan's development assistance policy toward Africa. That country's official

development assistance (ODA) charter stipulates that “full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and the introduction of a market-oriented economy and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country.”⁷ Although much more remains to be done on implementation, aid agencies such as the Japanese International Cooperation Agency are beginning actively to pursue good governance and greater respect for human rights as essential components of development activities in Africa.⁸

Collectively, the G8 governments have also supported governance and institutional development in Africa through support for several projects executed by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), two organizations that have invested substantial resources toward enhancing institutional effectiveness and improving economic governance in Africa. The continent is currently the largest beneficiary of such assistance from the IMF, and the World Bank devotes about 19 percent of its total Africa funding to activities that promote the rule of law, gender equality, and enhanced public administration on the continent.⁹

Challenges and Recommendations

Despite these contributions, the commitments to better governance and democracy are not being sustained in all cases, and some G8 members can do more. France, Japan, and Italy, in particular, should raise the profile of democracy and institutional development on their assistance agenda. Although the U.S. government has traditionally considered democracy a high priority on its global agenda, it has not placed consistent emphasis on funding programs that support democracy and good governance in Africa.¹⁰ Presumably, this slide reflects changes in priorities resulting from September 11, the war on terrorism, and increased spending on HIV/AIDS. Nevertheless, the importance of good governance in maintaining stability and enabling economic development argues for maintaining strong commitments in this area.

Another challenge is to increase G8 support to NEPAD and the APRM. These initiatives have great potential for promoting democracy, human rights, and institutional

⁷ See document at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/category/democratiz/1999/partner.html>.

⁸ See document at <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/activities/regions/09afr.html>.

⁹ See document at <http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2003/table/5-1.htm>.

¹⁰ Edward McMahon, “Commitment to Democracy and Institutional Reform: The G8 Performance,” paper presented at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, March 25, 2004.

development in Africa. Realizing this potential, however, depends not only on the credibility of the peer review process, but also on the availability of resources to ensure continuity and a reasonable degree of insulation from governmental control of that process. Both issues pose challenges for the G8 partners. The issue of funding, for instance, is one that is still being debated in African political circles. Many perceive external funding as potentially undermining the homegrown credentials of the APRM. Nonetheless, the African political terrain is littered with good initiatives that floundered for want of sufficient funding from subscribing states. Moreover, there is concern in some nongovernmental circles that funding solely from African governments for the peer review process might rob it of its independence and render it useless as a yardstick for evaluating commitment to reform. The G8, therefore, needs to find a middle ground that enables it to strengthen, through funding and technical support, the work of the APRM without undermining the African ownership essential to ensuring that the mechanism becomes effective. One strategy might be channeling bilateral and multilateral support through African organizations such as the African Capacity-Building Foundation, and the African Development Forum, as well as through the ECA. The APRM is also establishing a trust fund that should enable donors to help provide the short-term resources needed to get the initiatives off the ground without compromising African ownership. The APRM can also draw on the experience of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which offers excellent and to some extent standardized economic analyses of development programs for use in peer reviews of its members—in other words, a long-standing peer review process for donors

ENSURING PROSPERITY: TRADE, AID, DEBT RELIEF, AND INVESTMENT PROMOTION

In the AAP, the G8 countries committed themselves to foster trade, investment, economic growth, and sustainable development in Africa. Specific pledges include helping Africa attract investment, providing support for capacity-building and transfer of expertise for infrastructure development, helping to provide greater market access for African products, and increasing funding for trade-related technical assistance and capacity-building in Africa. Other commitments included the provision of support for African

efforts to advance regional economic integration and intra-African trade and helping to improve the effectiveness of ODA.

Promoting Trade

What Has Been Done? At Kananaskis, the G8 countries promised several measures to help grant Africa greater access to the world market. Toward this end, the G8 partners pledged to conclude by January 1, 2005, negotiations on further trade liberalization in the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations, “taking full account of the particular circumstances, needs and requirements of developing countries, including in Africa.”¹¹ Those needs include reducing export subsidies for G8 agricultural products and granting broader market access to African exports. To help Africa further, the G8 also pledged to work toward the “objective of duty-free and quota-free access for all products originating from the least developed countries (LDCs), including African LDCs,” as well as to increase support for projects that aim to improve the quality of trade-related technical assistance and capacity building in Africa.¹²

G8 countries have not been as successful in moving this agenda forward as they have been on other matters. The Doha round of the WTO trade negotiations launched in November 2001 has not achieved the goal of facilitating African exports, especially in the area of agriculture. Talks at the Cancún WTO ministerial meeting in September 2003 failed to resolve the relevant issues of trade-distorting farm supports and subsidies on agricultural exports as well as high tariffs that make it difficult for poor countries to compete. European and American subsidies and tariffs in agriculture are estimated to cost Africa billions of dollars annually in potential export earnings.¹³ The Doha round has so far also failed to resolve the issue of high industrial tariffs in other sectors, such as textiles, that are especially important to poor countries. Nevertheless, several G8 countries have explored bilateral means to facilitate trade with Africa. Furthermore, most G8 countries have other long-standing arrangements dedicated to helping Africa grow through trade.

¹¹ *The G8 Africa Action Plan*, 2002, available at http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/g8_documents/archives_from_previous_summits/kananaskis_summit_-_2002/g8_africa_action_plan.html.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ The United Nations Development Program estimates that crop subsidies by industrialized countries cost developing countries worldwide from \$125 billion to \$310 billion annually in lost sales and lower world prices. UN Department of Public Information, *African Recovery* 17: 4 (January 2004), p.20.

The United States has had a long history of supporting trade development in Africa. The Export-Import Bank, operational in eighteen African states in 1998, was functioning in thirty-four countries by 2001.¹⁴ Within that period, the bank increased the volume of both private- and public-sector credit in sub-Saharan Africa from \$50 million to about \$800 million.¹⁵

A more recent U.S. initiative, in line with AAP commitments to facilitating African exports, is the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Passed in 2000, AGOA provides quota- and duty-free access to U.S. markets for most African products, including—though with some restrictions—textiles. To date thirty-seven African countries have been designated as eligible for tariff preferences under the act. Under AGOA, African clothing exports to the United States grew by 46 percent from 2000 to 2001, reaching \$1.1 billion in 2002. This growth rate was surpassed in the first nine months of 2003.¹⁶ It is estimated that AGOA has produced about ninety thousand new jobs in South Africa and nearly seventeen thousand in Lesotho.¹⁷ The Bush administration has proposed to Congress an improved and expanded AGOA, extending the act to 2015 and creating new opportunities for African agricultural exports.

The United States is also negotiating free-trade agreements with Morocco and the Southern Africa Customs Union. Other G8 countries have also adopted various approaches to boosting trade with Africa. The EU, for example, has embarked on a series of regional and subregional trade negotiations to complement existing trade agreements with all Europe's former colonies.

Challenges and Recommendations. Progress on agricultural subsidies and tariffs remains a principal issue in G8-Africa trade relations. The G8 should review recent EU and U.S. proposals for addressing trade-distorting agricultural subsidies and high tariffs and discuss them with African leaders invited to the summit to see whether progress can be made. Furthermore, programs such as AGOA, while providing great stimulus for trade, can benefit only those countries that have the capacity to take advantage of the opportunities it supplies. To enhance the productive capacity in more African countries,

¹⁴ James A. Harmon and Witney Schneidman, "Evaluating G8 Commitment to Prosperity and Economic Development: Investment Promotion and Private Sector Development," paper presented at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, March 25, 2004.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

the G8 should consider providing technical assistance to spur industrial production, particularly in agro-industrial and small business sectors. Another looming problem is the end of the Multi-fiber Agreement (MFA), which sets regional and country quotas for textile imports. Unless special provision is made for Africa, the MFA's expiration in 2005 will pit incipient African textile producers against seasoned exporters such as China. Developing local capacity in Africa through technical assistance and funding is therefore essential and should be a priority for G8 countries. The G8 countries should also increase their investment in infrastructure and human resource development that will make Africa more competitive.

Promoting Investment

An important contributor to economic growth in Africa is greater investment. Recently the continent's share of foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased slightly from \$11 billion in 2002 to \$14 billion in 2003.¹⁸ These increases, however, reflect several large new investments in the oil sector and have not changed the reality for a majority of African countries that continue to languish in the investment wilderness. Collectively, African states continue to attract the smallest portion of global investment capital—about 1 percent of global FDI flows—largely because of concerns over political instability and inadequate market size. At Kananaskis, the G8 pledged to change this by helping Africa to attract investment, both from within the continent and from abroad. Accordingly, the G8 countries pledged support for African initiatives aimed at “improving the investment climate, including sound economic policies and efforts to improve the security of goods and transactions, consolidate property rights, modernize customs, institute needed legal and judicial reforms, and help mitigate risks for investors.”¹⁹ The partners also pledged to stimulate private investment on the continent through international cooperation, public-private partnership, innovative uses of export credit, and guarantees against political and commercial risks.

What Has Been Done? In various ways and through diverse means, the G8 partners have made major contributions toward helping Africa attract a greater share of global

¹⁸ United Nations, *World Economic Situation and Prospects 2004*, New York, NY, United Nations, 2004, p. 341.

¹⁹ *G8 Africa Action Plan*.

investment. Since 2001 the U.S. government, for instance, has provided more than \$700 million in investment support funds to sub-Saharan Africa through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The Canadian government also plans to support Africa with some C\$100 million in government funds matched by the private sector through the Canada Investment Fund for Africa. Italy, for its part, has established a €50 million fund to support joint ventures between the Italian and African private sectors. Other G8 countries have also made significant contributions both bilaterally and through multilateral arrangements. Japan, for instance, is committing up to \$300 million over five years in investment loans to Africa. The European Union has also established a €110 million investment promotion scheme (Proinvest) and a €2.2 billion investment facility under the auspices of the European Investment Bank to support investments in poor countries, the bulk of which are in Africa.

In addition, a joint British-French initiative has been established to promote investment in developing countries with joint financing of €200 million. Africa is expected to receive a majority of that support. The UK government has also teamed up with a private firm, Actis, to promote investment in developing countries. Through this joint venture, the Blair government is committing up to \$500 million per year for investment in Africa, China, and India. It should be mentioned, however, that unless the investment environment improves in African countries, the funds will not be properly used.

A major drawback to investment in Africa has been the poor state of infrastructure. Accordingly, African leaders highlighted as a top priority of NEPAD the development of the requisite infrastructure for economic growth. The G8 partners concurred and pledged at Kananaskis to assist Africa by “facilitating capacity-building and the transfer of expertise for the development of infrastructure projects, with particular attention to regional initiatives.”²⁰ This pledge has been kept in various ways. The Canadian government, for instance, took the initiative to support the establishment of an infrastructure-related project preparation facility within the African Development Bank. Japan has also committed up to \$1 billion for infrastructure development in Africa since 2003, and the United Kingdom has provided \$100 million to support the work of the

²⁰ Ibid.

Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund, which has already attracted some \$205 million of private-sector investment to help Africa develop its infrastructure.²¹

Challenges and Recommendations. Although the G8's record on investment promotion is impressive, much more remains to be done to help Africa attract a greater proportion of global capital flows. Undoubtedly African governments hold the primary responsibility for initiating policies to make their economies attractive to investors. Nonetheless, the G8 partners can do more to assist the continent.

The G8, for instance, should commit more resources to help Africa develop the liquidity, accessibility, and integration of its equity markets. This will facilitate the privatization of government industries and also provide a forum promoting domestic investment. Studies show that Africa's stock markets have grown at a remarkable rate over the last two years.²² In 2003, markets appreciated more than 30 percent in local currency in Tanzania and Botswana and 100 percent in Ghana. Over the same period, the Johannesburg stock market appreciated 25 percent in U.S. dollars. Moreover, African markets are considered inexpensive compared with those in Latin America, Asia, and the United States, and so can become attractive to investors when given the needed support.²³

Developing Africa's equity markets would also bring additional benefits by helping to curb the flight of capital, which could otherwise be invested in the domestic economy. Capital flight is a major concern for African states. The ECA has estimated that \$187 billion has left thirty African states over the past twenty-seven years. The G8 can help reverse this outflow by increasing support for the development of equity markets on the continent. Stopping capital flight will help Africa build the requisite capital pools for domestic investment and economic growth.

The G8 should also do more to help build competitive, growth-oriented African companies, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which can take advantage of export opportunities and domestic markets to create jobs. Although some of the G8-sponsored investment activity provides a small amount of investment in SMEs, much more capital and technical assistance is needed to promote this critical sector of the economy and, if possible, on a coordinated basis. Most of the G8 countries have specific

²¹ Harmon and Schneidman, "Evaluating G8 Commitment."

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

programs within their own countries to support SMEs (such as small-business loan programs in France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada); Africa could benefit greatly from development of similar programs.

Another challenge is support for regional economic integration, essential to promoting investment in Africa since it would expand the size of Africa's markets. Africa's fragmented markets are extremely unattractive to most foreign investors at present because they lack the advantages of scale available in larger and better-organized markets. Regional integration efforts will also help eliminate trade barriers and hence lead to greater intra-Africa trade.

Aid and Debt Relief

The G8 partners have also made progress on the twin issues of aid and debt relief. At Kananaskis and Evian, the G8 placed these issues at the top of the development agenda. ODA to Africa has recovered after declining in the 1990s, rising in 2002 to \$18.6 billion from \$17.3 billion the previous year. Collectively, the G8 countries already provide up to three-quarters of all ODA to Africa.

The Bush administration has announced two new special initiatives—the five-year, \$15 billion President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Account, which would increase annual U.S. ODA by \$5 billion, or 50 percent, over the five-year period starting in 2003. Although not directed solely to Africa, these programs will likely boost U.S. assistance to Africa substantially. The MCA is also particularly valuable in linking increased assistance to performance by the recipient country, a principle adopted at the United Nations Monterey Conference and endorsed by many development professionals. Other donors have not followed suit to the same degree.

Africa is a high priority for ODA from other G8 countries such as France and Japan. France, for instance, devotes as much as 46 percent of its overall international assistance to African countries.²⁴ France assisted Africa to the tune of about €2.34 billion in 2002 and expects its bilateral transfers to reach €3 billion in 2003.²⁵ Japan devotes 14

²⁴ See document at http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/cooperation/dgcid/direction/page_02.html.

²⁵ *Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan*, Evian, 2003. See document at http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/implementation_report_by_africa_personal_representatives_to_leaders_on_the_g8_african_action_plan.html

percent of its ODA to sub-Saharan Africa and intends to give greater priority to Africa in disbursements under its \$203 million Trust Fund for Human Security.²⁶ In addition, Japan also contributes significant sums of money to the Africa Capacity Building Foundation through the Policy Human Resources Development Trust Fund at the World Bank.²⁷ Moreover, Japan continues to assist Africa by helping to raise funds for basic needs on the continent through conferences such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development.

The British government has also made major commitments on this issue. In January 2003, for example, the UK Treasury and DFID launched a proposal for an International Finance Facility (IFF), a program designed to aid countries in meeting the Millennium Development Goals. The United States, however, does not support the IFF, in part because it is a lending facility rather than a system of grants—the latter being the U.S. preference. These impressive records notwithstanding, several challenges still need addressing to enhance effective delivery of ODA for Africa.

Debt relief for Africa commands an equally high place on the G8's development agenda. The continent continues to devote substantial portions of its GDP to debt-servicing obligations. Africa made \$11 billion in debt payments in 2002. Debt relief, particularly for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), is designed to reduce this outflow and help impoverished African states retain more of their incomes for investment in health, education, and other priority development areas. Thirty-four African states currently participate in the HIPC initiative. Many expect significant benefits from debt relief and restructuring.

Challenges and Recommendations. The G8 and African nations have different interpretations of the commitments regarding ODA. At a UN meeting in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002, G8 countries spoke of allocating 50 percent of an expected \$12 billion increase in ODA to Africa. African nations have taken this as a firm commitment. The United States, however, does not accept it as such, interpreting the commitment as one only to consider Africa for such further assistance based on other criteria and competing

²⁶ McMahan, "Commitment to Democracy."

²⁷ Ibid.

demands elsewhere. This issue needs to be clarified before it becomes a major source of contention.

More fundamentally, despite recent increases in ODA, the amounts being provided do not begin to meet the requirements for establishing basic health infrastructure in Africa or for meeting the UN Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015. According to the World Health Organization, developing basic health services alone for developing countries, a large number of which are in Africa, would require an additional \$27 billion in ODA annually until 2007, and up to \$38 billion over the succeeding eight years. The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization estimates that the Millennium Development Goal for education would require another \$5.6 billion annually. In essence, ODA is not nearly sufficient to address Africa's fundamental development objectives and is more than unlikely to meet the NEPAD goal of an additional \$64 billion in assistance per year.

That makes the issue of debt relief along with trade all the more urgent. Despite the progress and promise of HIPC, the process is slow and cumbersome. Only thirteen African countries have benefited to date. Moreover, HIPC does not address the debt problems of African countries that are not among the least developed, such as Nigeria and Kenya. Nigeria currently spends 20 percent of its federal budget on debt servicing, but that figure is expected to rise to 30 percent as unrecorded liabilities are identified. Moreover, not only are Nigeria and Kenya politically and economically important themselves, their development can spur growth in the poorer countries around them. Moreover, a focus on debt relief has masked the beneficial role of debt as low-cost capital in corporate and infrastructure finance. Although sixteen African countries now sport international credit ratings, many of these governments and their public-sector enterprises are constrained from raising nonconcessional debt under their country's HIPC-related agreements with the IMF, potentially increasing the financing costs of public-private partnerships for infrastructure development.

Lack of coordination of aid programs also remains a serious problem. The World Bank recently reported that there are eighty thousand separate aid projects operating in the developing world. In Tanzania alone, forty donors at one point maintained two thousand separate aid projects. The plethora of separate procedures and administrative requirements places an enormous burden on developing countries and, in particular, on the time and attention of key staff needed to direct development efforts. The lack of

coordination also decreases donor effectiveness. World Bank President James Wolfensohn describes the situation this way: “We’re not cooperating. We’re not coordinating. We’re not learning from the experience of others, and in some cases we’re not learning from our own experience.”²⁸

Although this problem has been around a long time, with little progress made in the past, better coordination is possible, as demonstrated recently by donors to the worldwide campaign against AIDS. At a meeting in Washington, major donors agreed to each recipient country’s having a single action program to coordinate donations, a single authority that receives the money, and a single system for monitoring and evaluating how it is spent.²⁹ The same effort needs to be made in other areas of assistance.

Trade, aid, and debt relief together are the key components of an effective G8 commitment to African development. Despite the significant progress that has been made, these remain issues of some contentiousness and unfulfilled promise.

SECURITY: PROMOTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN AFRICA

The G8 partners have devoted significant time and resources to helping Africa prevent and manage its destructive conflicts in order to promote social stability and create a more enabling environment for development. At Kananaskis, the G8 partners pledged support for ongoing conflict management efforts in countries such as the DRC, Sudan, Angola, and Sierra Leone; technical and financial support to enhance general conflict-management capacity (including a capacity to undertake peace operations by 2010); and support for effective peace building in societies emerging from or seeking to prevent violent conflicts. These efforts have to include not just reconciliation and reintegration of combatants, but also political and economic reintegration of marginalized groups. The G8 also pledged support for broader security efforts, such as the removal of land mines, checking the flow of illicit weapons, and protecting natural resources during conflicts, as well as providing assistance for war-affected populations.

²⁸ UN Department of Public Information, *Africa Recovery* 17: 4 (January 2004), p. 18.

²⁹ Elizabeth Becker, “Donor Nations Reach Accord for Efficient Use of AIDS Funds,” *New York Times*, April 26, 2004.

The Evian Summit (2003) reiterated these commitments and, focusing specifically on the pledge to provide support for an African capacity, by 2010, for peace operations.³⁰ G8 leaders outlined a three-step plan of action to (1) create a joint plan for developing African capability to undertake peace support operations; (2) train African peace support forces, including through the development of regional centers of excellence to train military and civilian personnel in conflict prevention and peace support, and (3) better coordinate peacekeeping training initiatives. To buttress these steps, the G8 at Evian recommended several actions, including the holding of annual consultations on capacity building with the AU, other donors, and peace and security institutions; greater support for the UN in its outreach to the AU on security matters; and assisting the AU in developing an African Standby Force modeled after the EU-led Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).

What Has Been Done?

The G8 countries have made substantial progress on many of the Kananaskis and Evian pledges. Collectively and bilaterally, the partners have supported conflict resolution and capacity development efforts in Africa.

Despite heavy military commitments elsewhere, the G8 countries have intervened directly in some African conflicts to prevent humanitarian crises and join other stakeholders in the search for resolution. The United Kingdom, for instance, provided military troops to Sierra Leone (2000), as did France in Côte d'Ivoire (2002) and the EU in the DRC (2003). The United States positioned forces off the coast of Liberia in the summer of 2003 and sent some ashore to facilitate the introduction of ECOWAS peacekeepers. The United States also provided logistical support to the peacekeeping force.

G8 support for African conflict resolution has also been channeled through the efforts of the AU and regional organizations, as well as through financial assistance, troop contributions, and logistics support for UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. The U.S. support for ECOWAS troops in the summer of 2003, for instance, was essential to successful intervention in Liberia. France, for its part, contributed significantly to the

³⁰ See

http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/implementation_report_by_africa_personal_representatives_to_leaders_on_the_g8_african_action_plan.html.

mediation efforts of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) in 2002 to end the conflict in the Central African Republic. G8 countries (and other partners) have also provided support for AU conflict-resolution efforts. In 2003, for instance, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France provided financial support for the AU's peacekeeping mission in Burundi, the organization's first. More recently, in March 2004, AU conflict-management efforts received a boost when the EU announced a €250 million fund to support future peacekeeping operations, as well as to help the organization develop an effective management system.

Another venue by which G8 countries have supported African conflict-resolution efforts is UN peacekeeping missions on the continent. G8 financial and logistical support enhances the effectiveness of such missions, making them more beneficial to the cause of African security.³¹ In 2000, for instance, SHIRBRIG played a pivotal role in helping the UN launch its peacekeeping mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. More, recently, SHIRBRIG played a key role in the successful transfer of ECOWAS peacekeeping duties in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire to the UN. Additionally, various G8 member countries have contributed in diverse ways to UN peacekeeping missions currently underway in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire.

The G8 has also assisted Africa in developing its conflict-management capacity through technical assistance and training programs aimed at enhancing the decision-making and operational skills of military and civilian personnel.³² The U.S. Department of Defense's Africa Center for Strategic Studies, for example, is assisting the ECOWAS Secretariat in evaluating the dynamics of the intervention in Liberia and drawing recommendations for improving future peacekeeping operations. The United States is also developing a new, five-year, \$660 million international peace initiative to help train and equip foreign troops for peacekeeping missions in their own regions.³³ The program, dubbed the Global Peace Operations Initiative, will focus primarily on Africa and strengthen existing plans to train ten battalions per year.

Further G8 assistance in this area has been administered through programs such as the U.S. African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, the British

³¹ Victoria Holt, "Evaluating G8 Commitments to Peace and Security in Africa," paper commissioned by the G8-Africa Partnership Project, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2004.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ "Bush Plans Foreign Peacekeeping Forces Fund," *Reuters*, April 19, 2004.

Military Advisory and Training Teams program, and France's Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping Capacities program. The governments of Italy, Germany, and Canada have also made significant contributions toward African conflict-management training and capacity development. The Italian government, for instance, brought African and EU leaders and experts together at a 2003 seminar on African conflicts and is currently assisting in training peacekeepers on the continent. German funds facilitated the establishment of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in Ghana. Although other G8 countries, notably Canada, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have also contributed to the work of the KAIPTC, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's presence at the center's inauguration in January 2004 underscores the importance Berlin attaches to the KAIPTC's mission to provide professional training and peacekeeping skills to African soldiers.

Canada, for its part, has devoted Canadian \$25 million (out of the \$500 million Canada Fund for Africa announced at the Kananaskis Summit) to help strengthen African security capacity and to address some of the needs of war-affected populations. Ottawa is also supporting programs geared toward improving the AU's early-warning system and ECOWAS's capacity as a manager of peace operations. In addition, the Canadians in March 2004 signed an agreement to collaborate with ECOWAS on peace and security initiatives and are funding a scholarship program to train West African civilians and military personnel at the KAIPTC.

Further support for training and capacity-building has come from the EU, which is backing AU efforts to improve its conflict-management systems. At the April 2004 EU-Africa ministerial meeting in Dublin, for instance, EU leaders expressed support for the AU's intention to establish an Early-Warning System and plans to create an African Stand-by Force by 2010 to manage complex emergencies.³⁴

Challenges and Recommendations

These efforts by the G8 notwithstanding, much remains to be done to help resolve conflicts and build peace in Africa. Strengthening African peacekeeping capacity is especially important because the contributions of G8 members to UN peacekeeping

³⁴ Communiqué of the EU-Africa Ministerial in Dublin, Ireland, April 2004. See document at <http://216.239.57.104/search?q=cache:cUDjEyuAWR4J:ue.eu.int/pressData/en/er/79814.pdf+Communiqu%C3%A9+of+the+EU-Africa+Ministerial+in+Dublin,+Ireland,+April+1,+2004.&hl=en>

operations have declined. From 1991 to 1998, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the United States were among the top twenty nations contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions, accounting for about 17 percent of UN peacekeeping personnel. From 1999 to 2003, however, only the United Kingdom and the United States remained in the top twenty, and they contributed less than 4 percent of the total UN peacekeeping personnel. Within the same period, developing countries (including the African countries of Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya) became the top-ten troop-contributing nations, accounting for nearly 60 percent of the deployed UN peacekeepers from 1999 to 2003.³⁵

African regional and subregional organizations are nevertheless still extremely weak in planning, executing, and supporting peacekeeping operations. ECOWAS mission planning, for instance, is hampered by inadequate communications links between the early-warning centers and headquarters.³⁶ Support systems for troops in the field are poorly organized. The G8 should also take a broader view of African conflicts and explore measures to address the negative role played by governments that undermine regional peace-building efforts and sponsor destructive insurgencies against neighboring states. In addition, the G8 can help African conflict-management institutions and the United Nations enhance recruitment, retention, and effective deployment of troops and civilian police by supporting the standardization of training through a joint certification process for the United Nations, the AU, and regional institutions such as ECOWAS. Programs designed to help African countries deal with the reportedly high prevalence of HIV infection among the military, and the implications for peacekeeping, should receive priority attention. The U.S. European Command has been particularly responsive to this problem, but HIV/AIDS testing, counseling, and treatment are only sporadically available in the continent's military services.

To enhance rapid response, the G8 should also consider supporting the AU's call for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping logistics base in Africa similar to the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy—or expanding the capacity of Brindisi to back-stop additional missions in Africa. The African Stand-by Force proposed by the AU deserves further study, with particular attention to compatibility with subregional arrangements as in West Africa.

³⁵ Victoria Holt, "Evaluating G8 Commitments."

³⁶ Jason Ladnier and Patricia Taft, *Fund for Peace*, Washington, DC, March 2004, cited in Victoria Holt, "Evaluating G8 Commitments."

Another area in which the G8 can increase its assistance is the training of police and civil law-enforcement capacities. Conflicts often destroy established systems of law and governance and pose serious threats to human rights and security at the community level. All too often, moreover, as in Nigeria, African governments deploy their militaries to contain civil unrest, when police capability is inadequate to the task. The result is often excessive use of force and serious human rights violations. G8 responses to these problems have been very limited. The United States has provided less than \$3 million toward the restructuring of the security forces in the DRC, even though creating a unified national army is critical to the peace process there. None of the G8 members has provided security assistance to Nigeria. The U.S. Congress has blocked training of the Nigerian military, and no donor is assisting Nigeria's poorly trained and equipped police force. The G8 can also help fund the creation of a UN/AU database of experts on the rule of law to expedite deployment.

Finally, there is still an important role for better-trained and equipped troops from the G8 who can support UN and regional peacekeeping operations. G8 action on this matter will go a long way to ensure that such peacekeeping missions deploy on time and achieve desired results. The United Kingdom's involvement in Sierra Leone, France's in Côte d'Ivoire, and the EU's in the DRC demonstrated the value of the side-by-side deployment of Western and African forces. G8 members such as Japan, Russia, and Germany that have traditionally played less-visible military roles abroad can increase their support for UN peacekeeping by helping meet logistics and transport needs essential to successful peacekeeping. In this vein, all G8 countries should consider participating more fully in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System, in which volunteer countries share information on specified resources that they may volunteer within an agreed response time for UN peacekeeping operations.

MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AAP

The G8 is not an operational body. Its commitments have to be implemented through the ministries and agencies of the individual governments. But in the case of the AAP, the G8 and African leaders established the Africa Partners Forum. This forum brings together expert representatives from the G8 and Africa to monitor the commitments made under

the AAP. Moreover, to widen support for the AAP, the forum includes representatives of other major donor countries and institutions.

The forum represents a unique instrument created by the G8 and reflects a special commitment to the African partnership. In its initial meetings, the forum commissioned papers on the status of progress in education, HIV/AIDS, economic growth, and peace and security. The United States, however, has pressed the forum to avoid becoming a general “talk shop.” Instead, the United States has proposed that the forum concentrate on one or two specific areas under the AAP, examine the obstacles to progress, and move to eliminate them. The forum will thus focus in depth on food security and peace and security in the coming months.

There is concern in Africa that the forum, as a more or less technical body, will become a substitute for G8 political focus on Africa and thus will weaken the G8 commitment to greater resources, trade concessions, and other still unfulfilled aspects of the partnership. The loss of political focus would also deprive African leaders of direct discussion of their perspectives and concerns with their G8 counterparts. It is too early to judge the validity of these fears. But the African’s concern underlines the importance of the G8 leaders’ reiterating at the Sea Island Summit their commitment to the partnership and to achieving all its objectives, however politically challenging (as with trade) and over whatever time period is required, and reiterating as well their expectations about African progress. Such a statement would also assure African leaders that the G8 remains open to continued dialogue with African leaders at future summits.

CONCLUSION

The Africa Action Plan represents a unique commitment by the G8 to an especially vulnerable and important area of the developing world. That commitment is justified by Africa's isolation from the overall progress in global economic integration and growth over the last twenty years and the persistent poverty and instability in Africa. The special attention from the G8 has also provided political support and encouragement to African leaders who have developed, championed, and begun to fulfill the principles of NEPAD.

Yet these same leaders fear that the momentum of this partnership will be slowed at the U.S.-hosted summit at Sea Island in 2004. The United States can point to the Africa Partners Forum as a measure of not only the G8's continued commitment to the AAP but also as the creation of a specific mechanism to monitor implementation. And it can take up some issues at the summit that bear upon Africa, such as food security and debt relief for certain post-conflict countries.

But these cannot substitute, symbolically or politically, for the G8 leaders' reiterating the importance they accord to the special overall partnership with Africa. Symbols and substance are both important for keeping the G8-Africa partnership alive and constructive.

The U.S. decision to invite African heads of state to Sea Island provides symbolic recognition and the opportunity for African leaders to discuss their concerns directly. The United States, as host, needs to go further and recognize Africa's relevance to the three global themes under discussion. As much as other regions may dominate the discussion at Sea Island, incorporating Africa into the main agenda will reinforce the importance accorded to those aspects of the AAP that bear directly on these global matters. It will lay a foundation for a full review of the AAP as a major agenda item at the G8 Summit in 2005—not as separate from these three global themes, but as part of them.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A:

G8-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP PROJECT MEETINGS AND PRESENTATIONS

February 4, 2004, Roundtable, “Assessing the G8-Africa Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC:

CHRIS MULLIN, Member of Parliament and Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Africa and the Commonwealth, UK Visas, and the FCO’s Information Directorate, Foreign Office, United Kingdom, “UK Perspectives on the G8-Africa Partnership.”

CONSTANCE ANNE PENCE, G8 Coordinator for Undersecretary of State Alan P. Larson, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Perspectives on the G8-Africa Partnership.”

ROBLE OLHAYE, Ambassador of the Republic of Djibouti and Dean of the African Diplomatic Corps, “Sustaining the G8-Africa Partnership—An African View.”

March 25, 2004, Roundtable, “The G8 Partnership,” Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY:

IBRAHIM A. GAMBARI, Undersecretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa, United Nations, “Progress in the Implementation of NEPAD: Issues and Perspectives.”

IDRISS JAZAIRY, Ambassador of Algeria, “NEPAD, Democracy, and Africa’s Development.”

April 7, 2004, Meeting, “Africa and the G8: Assessing the G8-Africa Partnership and Recommendations for Sea Island and Beyond,” Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London:

SIR NICHOLAS BAYNE, KCMG, Fellow at the International Trade Policy Unit, London School of Economics and Political Science, “Lessons from Past G-8 Summits: The Way Forward.”

GARETH THOMAS, Member of Parliament and Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, Department for International Development, United Kingdom, “The UK Vision for the Africa Action Plan.”

FRANÇOIS CROQUETTE, Embassy of France to the United Kingdom, “French Perspectives on G8-Africa Relations.”

DAVID ANGELL, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada, “Canadian Perspectives on G8-Africa Relations.”

MARK MALAN, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana, “African Peacekeeping and the Challenges for the G8 Action Plan.”

ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, South Africa, “From Cape to Casablanca: Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture.”

LAURAH HARRISON-BACHNACK, African Capacity Building Foundation, “Assessing G8-Africa Partnership: Democracy & Governance.”

APPENDIX B: MEMBERS OF THE G8-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP PROJECT

The G8-Africa Partnership Project is grateful to those who contributed their views and expertise. (This report does not necessarily reflect the views of these individuals or of affiliated institutions.)

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APPENDIX C: COMMISSIONED PAPERS

“Commitment to Democracy and Institutional Reform: The African Performance,”
Kwame Boafo-Arthur (University of Ghana)

“Commitment to Democracy and Institutional Reform: The G8 Performance,” Edward R.
McMahon (University of Vermont)

“Evaluating G8 Commitment to Prosperity and Economic Development: Investment
Promotion and Private Sector Development,” James A. Harmon (Harmon & Co.) and
Witney W. Schneidman (Schneidman & Associates International)

“Evaluating G8 Commitment to Prosperity and Economic Development: Trade
Promotion and Regional Integration,” Margaret C. Lee (Georgetown University)

“Evaluating G8 Commitments to Peace and Security in Africa,” Victoria K. Holt (Henry
L. Stimson Center)

“An Evaluation of the G8’s Commitment to the Kananaskis Pledges,” John Kirton and
Ella Kokotsis (University of Toronto)

APPENDIX D: THE AFRICA POLICY STUDIES PROGRAM

The Africa Policy Studies Program of the Council on Foreign Relations conducts studies, issues reports, and carries out research on important policy issues regarding Africa. Recent studies and publications have addressed the U.S. response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the terrorist threat in Africa, U.S. capacity for crisis diplomacy, a retrospective on early UN diplomacy in post-independence Africa, and U.S. policy in Liberia. Visit www.cfr.org for more information.

