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Samantha Power, the Anna Lindh professor of the practice of global leadership and public policy at Harvard Kennedy School and professor of practice at Harvard Law School, discusses the United Nationsâ role in global governance, at a time when the United States is withdrawing from multilateral treaties and institutions, as part of CFRâs Academic Conference Call series.
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Speaker
Anna Lindh Professor of the Practice of Global Leadership and Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School; Professor of Practice, Harvard Law School
FASKIANOS: Good afternoon from New York, and welcome to the CFR Academic Conference Call Series. Iâm Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR.
Todayâs call is on the record. And the audio and transcript will be available on our website, at CFR.org.
We are delighted to have Samantha Power with us to discuss âThe Role of the United Nations in Global Governance.â Ambassador Power is the Anna Lindh professor of the practice of global leadership and public policy at Harvard Kennedy School, professor of practice at Harvard Law School, and a fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study. From 2013 to 2017, she served as the 28th U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, as well as a member of President Obamaâs Cabinet. In this role, Ambassador Power became the public face of U.S. opposition to Russian aggression in Ukraine and Syria, negotiated sanctions against North Korea, lobbied to secure the release of political prisoners, helped build new international law to counter ISILâs financial networks, and supported President Obamaâs actions to end the Ebola crisis. From 2009 to 2013, she served on the National Security Council as special assistant to the president and senior director for multilateral affairs and human rights. And she also served, from 2005 to 2006, as an international affairs fellow here at CFR.
In 2003, she won the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Critics Circle Award for her book âA Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide.â If you havenât read it, I commend it to you all. And she is currently writing a new book, âThe Education of an Idealist,â which will chronicle her years in public service, and reflect on the role of human rights and humanitarian ideals in contemporary politics.
Ambassador Power, weâre delighted and honored to have you with us today. Thank you very much for taking the time. I thought we could begin by having you talk about the role of the United Nations in global governance, particularly during thisâthese tumultuous times.
POWER: Sure. Thatâs the understatement of the day. Thank you very muchâ
FASKIANOS: Exactly. (Laughs.)
POWER: âIrina, and thanks to CFR for all of the work that you all do to try to sustain a constituency to even have a foreign policy in a time when people are quite tempted to turn inward and where our polarization is impeding constructive action, unfortunately, on a lot of fronts.
Iâm going to try to speak quite briefly because I know how many young people and how many professors we have on the call have some, Iâm sure, with their own very specific slice of interest as it relates to the U.N. or to U.S. foreign policy. So Iâll just give a very broad overview at the outset and, again, try to be succinct.
When I encounter people who have questions about the U.N., I encounterâand perhaps many of you on the call do as wellâa surprising amount of misunderstanding, given how long this organization has been with us, 72 years now, going on. Thereâs still a sense that the kind of U.N. is an actor in its own right with an engine, a bank account, evenâsome people even think an army of its own. And, of course, thatâs not at all true.
The success of the U.N. and the limits of the U.N. to perform a constructive role in the world that we need it to perform, those limits and that extent is defined by member statesâof which there are 193âand very specifically by the powerful member states, specifically the permanent members of the Security Councilâthe United States, Britain, France, China, and Russiaâbut also, you know, the emerged powers like India, Japan, you know, Germany. I mean, these are countries that invest a huge share of the resources that get spent every year by the U.N., whether on U.N. kind of core infrastructure like the building, the headquarters, the salaries, the secretary-general and his staff, or humanitarian funding, or peacekeeping missions. The share of those resources come from a very, very small number of countries relative to the broader membership. And so, while the U.N. is an actor in its own rightâthere are people who carry baby blue and white passports and, in effect, salute the U.N. flag as their almost primary flag in their place of workâall those people work and do what they do because of the investment of member states. So even when the U.N. is an actor in its own right, itâs at the mercy of the generosity of and the investments made by countries like ours. So thatâs the U.N. as an actor, where that dependency exists.
The secretary-general is an actor in and of himself. But again, thereâs not a check that he can write or soldier or policeman he can send without the approval of the member states. And so, again, people have joked over the years that the secretary-general is more secretary than general. I think we have in the current secretary-general, Antonio Guterres, a very unusual leader, somebody whoâs been head of state but also run UNHCR, the refugee agency, for a decade at the time of the largest displacement crisis since the Second World War. Heâs, I think, a very articulate leader. He uses the pulpit as secretary-general very effectively and quite forcefully. But it is just a pulpit, and he will be at his best and at his most effective when he can get the major powers to be going in the same direction. So, again, thatâs the U.N. as an actor.
What the U.N. is that I expected, with the U.N. as a stage where countries come together to be themselves, and they bringâthey park their conceptions of their national interests, they park their values such as they are, and they advocate for them in one big scrum. Now, again, even in that scrum on that stage, some countries have more leverage and more influence and more rulemaking authority than others. The permanent members of the Security Council, of course, are atop that list because they are able to decide what is legal under international law as it relates to the use of force. They are able to put in place coercive measures like economic sanctions and lift sanctions when change is secured, or when circumstances change.
They have a very important roleââwe,â I should say, because it includes the United Statesâin not only norm-setting, but norm enforcement, you know, in really deciding, OK, you know, massive sexual violence has been carried out in South Sudan; what are we going to do about it? I mean, the norm against sexual violence which the Security Council can enshrine and the General Assembly can enshrine is all well and good, but then when a concrete case arises and the Security Council canât agree on doing anything about it, that norm starts to feel, you know, quite flimsy. And the flimsierâI think this is what we saw with the displacement crisis and with a lot of the violence in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East in recent years, is a kind of crisis of confidence born of state failure and humanitarian suffering gives rise to a real demand on the countries within the U.N. to perform and to find a way to cooperate. And when they failâand Iâll come to a couple examples of when weâve succeeded and when weâve failedâwhen we fail, then thatâitâs sort of a doom loop in the sense that people donât know where else to turn, and you start to feel almost a contagion of state weakness and a sense that non-state actorsâvarious non-state actors are going to take advantage of that. Then thereâs a culture of impunity that starts to develop, where a leader in one stateâletâs say the president of South Sudanâlooks and sees that thereâs been no consequences for the president of Burundi, and says, well, this is aâthis is a world order I can live with, because now I can do what I want. And so, again, I think weâin recent years it has been a struggle with leaders feeling impunity.
And I think it was very important that in the effort against ISIL, starting with Obama and some of that progress has been continued, but the rollback of ISILâs territorial gains were very, very important, most especially for the people living in those areas and for the threats that arose from those areas, but also because it showed that the countries comprising the international system could cooperate with one another, could stymie the flow of people and of money into terrorist hands. And thereâs a lot of work, of course, left to be done. But halting ISIS in its tracks, rolling that back, again, helps get us back, at least in one domain, on a more virtuous cycle where people think, oh, OK, international institutions can be a stage where countries come together. They can agree on new norms. They can then go about enforcing those norms. That can make a difference on the ground. People canât be left terrorized, even if far too many people are still being terrorized. So the ISIS coalition, while, you know, too much suffering had already occurred, I think was very important.
The other, I think, very positive example of the U.N. as a stage, by and large, but also performing some role in the field as an actor its own right, was Ebola, which was mentioned in the intro. And there is a perfect example of how, when the U.N. works, how it works. It works because in that instance the United Statesâbut it could be another country, but it almost never is another countryâsteps forward and does what President Obama did at the time of pure panic across the United States. And a number of even Democratic senators and congressmen calling for travel bans to prevent health workers from returning from West Africa, from treating Ebola patients. Obama said, if we donât deal with this at itâat its root, weâre going to have a major problem here and weâre going to see colossal suffering of a kind, you know, weâve never seen before. I mean, the exponential rate of spread was one of the most chilling things that I have seen on the horizon in my lifetime.
And the president said, OK, so, weâthis isnât going to be fun. And weâre going to be pushing water uphill here in the political climate that we have, but Iâm going to send 3,000 troops and health workers into the eye of the storm. And you, Samantha, and the rest of our diplomatsâSecretary Kerry and others, and ambassadors around the worldâyouâre going to go build a coalition because Iâm giving you what you need. Iâm giving you the amount and investment and you need to go multiply that leverage ourâwhat we are doing to get China, Japan, Germany, Denmark, you know, all these countries along.
And that is whatâbecause of that investment and political courage I think that he showed, we were then able to get other countries toâI wouldnât say necessarily pull all of their weight, but certainly we addressed a free rider problem that we see on too many crises. And a lot of countries showed up. And there was too much duplication. It wasnât as well-coordinated as anybody would want. But the fact of the matter is we went from seeing 8.5 million infections on an exponentially spreading virusâyou know, that number was going to be arrived at five months henceâto ending the Ebola epidemic in those three countries.
And thatâs, again, systemâwhen it works, and then with the coalition built we then empowered the U.N. to set up a coordinating mechanism. Itâs the U.N. that spends a lot of the money that the international community invested. But fundamentally itâs those countries that make the U.N. work in service of what you might call global governance. The negative examples are many, of course. Certainly, the refugee crisis not seeing the kind of burden sharing that you need, where now you have 4.5 million Syrian refugees, as one example, living in the countries that neighbor Syria. And Germany, of course, carrying a very large share of theâof the refugee population that tried to move into Europe. But a number of EU countries saying no and now, as we see in the United States, a drastic drop in the number of refugees we are prepared to take.
The system just doesnât work if big countries like ours walk away from our responsibility to do our share, which I think is sort of the opposite of Ebola. It gives permission that theyâre looking for. A lot of leaders donât want to push political water uphill either, right, and know that thereâs fear there, and thatâand thereâs demagoguery, and a lot of legitimate fears, and a lot of very false claims that areâthat are out there. And they see the United States doing what itâs doing and itâs, again, a sort of domino effect of the worst possible kind, which will just place, again, an even steeper burden on those countries which have much lower GDPs, much less of an ability, you know, to maintain such enormous refugee populations. But they would be the ones stuck carrying the load.
The Syria conflict is another example where, despite, you know, years of effort and brawn, and Secretary Kerry giving hisâall of his energy to this the last couple years that he was secretary of state, you know, we just hit a brick wall. And we hit a brick wall which happens too often, which is when the Security Council is dividedâas it was because the U.S., the U.K. and France had one view of the situation, Russia had another, and China followed Russiaâs position, although not with a huge amount of gusto. But when that kind of gridlock occurs on the Security Council, the principal organ that has been designated to deal with a crisis of this magnitude, a threat to peace and security of this scale, is justâitâs a no-show.
And so with, you know, whatever it is now, seven Russian vetoesâsix or seven Russian vetoes on relatively mild measures throughoutâwith the exception of an International Criminal Court to find out what was going onâlike, relatively robust by the Security Council standards effort. Everything else was really quite mild. And there was just a wholly different perspective. A perspective on Russiaâs side of just backing the Assad regime no matter what it did was going to be the best way to stabilize the situation. Our belief that when you have a country that is ruled a now-minority of the population, when such brutality is used to repress initially just political protest and then eventually a rebellion.
When that kind of brutality is used, the ability to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again and for that leader to ever stabilize the country and the situation a real way, and ever really deal with the recruitment appeal of his tactics for very bad actors like ISISâevil actors like ISISâwe just believe that in the long run that approach is not going to work. Now, we can talk about that fact that as a U.N.âagain, you can blame the U.N. for that, but fundamentally itâs about two very large countries with a lot of pull within the kind of executive branch of the U.N. just seeing the conflict completely differently. And frankly, a willingness on the part of the Russian Federation to initially look away from and then contribute to some of the worst atrocities that weâve seen in the last 50 years.
So thatâs the system as it is. Just one brief word before we open it up on where we are now. I think, you know, the contrast between President Obamaâs approach to international institutions and multilateralism, collective security and the current administration is very stark and very dramatic. Itâs probably the biggest contrast between two presidents whoâve succeed oneâfar greater contrast than between President Clinton and President George W. Bush, I think itâs fair to say. And to me, the Trump approach, just in terms of enhancing our security which is the rubric under which it is being wagedâis not likely to be effective on that axis because the way the U.N. works is itâs a system.
And if you approach it ala carte and just go to it when you need somethingâso, when you need sanctions against North Korea, which have been achieved and itâs very important that theyâve been achievedâand then look for enforcement of sanctions on North Korea, itâs not as if the actions you take, letâs say on the Iran deal, exist in a vacuum. They have great bearing then on countriesâ willingness, if youâre North Korea, to ever engage in a diplomatic process, to give up nuclear weapons, of course. But also even the countries that otherwise would need to be part of an enforcementâa really, really strict and vigilant enforcement mechanism.
So too, you know, pulling out of the Paris agreement, when you have small member states at the U.N., you know, literally disappearing under water. You know, we relied on those small countries. They were huge supporters of the United States when we needed them on really tough issues like LGBT rights. You know, when youâre disappearing under water and the most powerful country in the world walks away from an agreement that is existentially important to your existence, I suspect the relations, again, with small countries who donât have a huge amount of leverage in the international system, but nonetheless are votes, and important votes, on issues like Ukraine, where we denied Russiaâs ability to formally annex Crimea and, you know, got 100 countries to vote with us. A lot of those were small countries that appreciated the fact that the United States stood with them, you know, in their many, many hours of need over the years.
So I think ala carteism has traditionally not been effective. And the precise nature of the main threats that we faceâand there are, of course, major threats posed by Russia and more medium-term but very significant threats and risks associated with Chinaâs rise. But the sort of main threats that are before us today. The extreme weather that is produced by climate change. The spread of ISIS and its kind, because it isnât only ISIS, itâs a mentality that shows up in Boko Haram or in regional terrorist movementsâin terrorist movements that exist in countries where we have embassies and we have our aid workers and we have our citizens and tourists traveling.
We need to build coalitions. You know, these are threats that are very wily and donât respect borders. And we need to harness an institution that, when it worksâwhich, again, is not as often as it should, but can deal with threats like Ebola, which cross borders, and can mobilize states to build norms together and then, on good days, hold those states accountable to those norms. So I think others have made the point, of course, that we areâat a time when China is already throwing its weight around much more within the U.N. systemâwe are hastening Chinaâs rise and Chinaâs leadership role within the U.N. We are hastening the demise of you might call it the American century or a more unipolar moment, but that moment has downsides, right, in terms of burden sharing and so forth.
And some of the frustrations of the current administration were shared and articulated very forcefully by us in the previous administration about the need for other countries to pull their weight more often within the international system. But the way to get other countries to pull their weight and make the U.N. work, and make international law the taming force, is not to walk away from international law and not to ridicule countriesâthe countries that comprise the U.N. and cut funding to the institution itself. So I suspect this is not going to be very effective. And, indeed, I donât think a China-led U.N. is one that is going to do much positive as it relates to promoting U.S. interests and values.
And indeed, I really worry that some of the actual action that has come out of the U.N., which has been the product of U.S. leadership across Republican and Democratic administrations, that those actions will be harder and harder for the executive branch, as it were, the Security Council, and other parts of the U.N., to effectuate. Because I think youâll start to see China sensing an opening, and having a very different conception of what the U.N. should be in the 21st century.
So with that, why donât we, Irina, you couldâat yourâon your heeding, open it up.
FASKIANOS: That sounds great. Thank you very much for that tour de force. Letâs open up to the students for their questions.
OPERATOR: Yes, maâam. At this time, we will open the floor for questions.
(Gives queuing instructions.)
Our first question comes from Stockton University.
Q: What is your opinion on Trumpâs new travel ban, or any other foreign policy for the future of the U.S. and the U.N.?
POWER: What is my position on the travel ban, is that what you said?
Q: Yes.
POWER: And what was the second question? And any, what?
Q: Or any other foreign policy for the future of the U.S. and the U.N.?
POWER: Iâm not sure I understand that part of the question, but Iâll take the first part of the question, which I think itâs deeply troubling for all the reasons that many courts have stuck it down. It is fundamentally sending a signal that we believe Muslims are terrorists. And we in this country for a long time have believed in individual responsibilityâthatâs the essence of our nationâand holding people accountable for what they do rather than because of some identity that they are born into or thatâbecause of how they pray. So itâs deeply troubling and itâs a surefire way to provide a propaganda boost to the very terrorists weâre trying to figure, because they are using this show that we are anti-Muslim and to radicalize people and to bring recruits into their ranks. So extremely disruptive and deeply embarrassing for a country that had, until recently, led on human rights.
FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question.
OPERATOR: Our next comes from Colby College.
Q: Ambassador Power, thank you for your talk. My question is, what structural changes would you make to the U.N. to make it more effective in the future?
POWER: Thank you. You know, thatâs a question we get a lot. And if you followed what I was saying, the challenge in answering the question is the same challenge that exists at the U.N. itself, which is any structural change has to go through those five permanent members who, you know, I canât think of really a time when the division betweenâsince the Cold Warâwhere the division between the United States and Russia has been so significant, where Chinaâs rise means that it is going to be, again, asserting itself much more. So to take the Security Council membership, if youâthatâs one of the changes that one could consider, because the membership is kind of old school. Itâs from 1945. You know, the fiveâthe World War II victors and France sitting there as permanent members. Europe is massively overrepresented on the Security Council as a permanent member. And youâd love to see something much more representative of the 2017, you know, kind of power dynamics. Economic and global heft should be reflected in your global body, presumably.
But forâin order for the five permanent members to settle on which countries should actually be represented on the U.N. Security Council, it just isnâtâit isnât realistic, because, again, of the very, very different worldview. And we looked at this under the Obama administration. Like, could we make it more legitimate and moreâso more legitimate, more representative of the contemporary world and its power dynamics, while not inhibiting its effectiveness? And the truth is, you donât even get out the gate because the countries that China would wish to see on the Security Council and the countries that they would impede standing membership on the Security Council sort of ends the conversation almost at minute one.
And then if you expanded it just numerically, youâre just probably going toâand the permanent membership of today doesnât changeâyou still have the gridlock on core issues like Ukraine and Syria. And probably, you know, more countries would feel like theyâre part of that institution. So thereâs something, I suppose, they would deem positive about that. But in terms of actual outcomes from the U.N., itâs not clear what that would achieve. So thatâs a longwinded way of saying that Security Council reform I think is unlikely to happen anytime soon. And one reason structures like the G-20 have taken off in the last decade is because countries like India, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, you know, haveâand the rest of usâhave needed a venue for bringing together the key economic and political stakeholders in the world.
I think, you know, thereâs too much bloat in the U.N. And we slashed that some from different parts of the U.N. over the length of the Obama administration, stabilized a budget that has been ballooning previously. But I think an approach that is simply cutting and not actually looking substantively at what work is being done and what will be lostâas I think just happened in the Democratic Republic of CongoâI think thatâs very problematic. So you have countries that just dig in and just want to kind of protect their turf or their sinecures. Thatâs terrible. And weâre hoping that China, because itâs become a much bigger donor to the U.N., can help Western countries like the United States and the Europeans really fight those impulses. But by the same token, we donât want to just go in, as China does, and cut all the human rights posts, you know, from U.N. missions in order toâthey say to save money, but really they just want to do away with human rights posts.
So structural change is really hard. But the way the U.N. will change will be when the countries that comprise it pursue policies within the international system that are more enlightened and look more to the medium and long term than to scoring political points on a Twitter feed.
FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question.
OPERATOR: Our next question comes from Washington University.
Q: Hi. My name is Cynthia Fox.
I was inspired by United Nations back when I was in high school. Iâve been practicing law nowâIâm a graduate of Washington School of Law for 44 years. And back in high school, I was an enthusiastic participant in model U.N. and also in college. And I was inspired, in fact, to become an attorney because of Khrushchev yelling at the podium, pounding on the podium with his shoe, screaming, âya khochu mira,â I want peace. I thought that was a really weird way to describe you wanted peace. (Laughter.) But so I have this long-term lover for the U.N. But I also have this memory of what happened to the League of Nations. And I know that the United Nations addressed some of those, but I happen to be a divorce lawyer. I wanted to go to the U.N., but I couldnât leave my beloved St. Louis. So warring couples was the closest thing I could get to the United Nations. And the precepts worked well, I might add.
But what Iâm getting at is that while I view the U.N. like warring couples, itâto keep a marriage together it takes a commitmentâa deep, abiding commitment to get through thick and thin. And while under this administration, you know, we had these horrendous storm clouds overhead. And Iâm think of this threat to cut the subsidies under the Affordable Care Act, and to sabotage it repeatedly so that one way or another he kills the Affordable Care Act. I think that the signs are there that he could do the same to the United Nations. I wonder how long the U.N. would survive without the funding of the U.S. at its current levels? And worst-case scenario, the Donald may be eyeing that real estate. (Laughter.) But seriously, how long would a hold back of funds from U.S. take before it did serious damage to the United Nations?
POWER: Well, Iâd say a few things. You know, the decision to situate the U.N. within the United States is a major strategic advantage for the United States, right? It symbolizes Americaâs power. It certainly symbolizes everything we did in the Second World War and beyond, with the Marshall Plan and the construction of the post-war order that mainlined a very maintained a very long peace for a long time and brought unprecedented prosperity to parts of the world that had never experienced it, created a broad global middle classâletting people down like crazy, we know now, but nonetheless, an architecture that was really important. But was no coincidence that the World Bank and the IMF and the U.N. are here in the United States.
And so if you saw a retreat of thatâit depends on the magnitude. Like, if you see them cutting funds as they are nowâtheyâre just slashing peacekeeping missions and slashing funding for programs that are extremely important in the developing world and beyond. But if they go further than thatâand, you know, there are calls to pull out of the U.N.âyou wouldâyou would rapidlyâI think the organism, such as it is, would adapt. And it would adapt in a way that would be very, very harmful for U.S. interests. I mean, thereâs a wayâas frustrating as it can be, and I know first-hand from eight years of working U.N. issues, four of which were as ambassador representing this amazing countryâyou know, theâother countries would beâthere are some countries that would just be thrilled by that prospect, right?
China has gone from being one of the smallest donors to the U.N.âyou know, almost like one of those very, very small countries back when it joined in the U.N. as the PRCâto now being the number-two donor to peacekeeping and the number-three donor to the overall budget. If the United States stepped aside, it would be terrible financially for other countries, because in order to get the work done they need to do for the sake of their people and their interests theyâd probably have to chip in more. This is allâthe amount that anyone pays is deduced by virtue of a formula that takes into account your GDP and your per capita income and so forth. So they wouldnât like the financial drain on that. But countries that donât see the world the same way we do, like China, would have open season to shape the 21st century world order.
And in terms ofâI donât see that happening. I see sort of the opposite. I see that while the U.N. has been an easy punching bag for, frankly, a lot of people for a very long time. And, again, some of the frustrations people feel, I think, are warranted because of the impasses we reach when we really need to be cooperating and compromising, or just standing up against aggression and injustice, as we do a very large share of the time. But, you know, I donâtâI see cooler heads prevailing, so far, as it relates to, for instance, foreign aid. The Trump budget on foreign aid was an abomination. I mean, just slashing, slashing, cuttingâyou know, just some bean counter with no regard for the interests that are advanced by investing, letâs say, in anti-HIV programs. Or, as General Mattis, our defense secretary said, you know, you cut foreign aid and let me know, because Iâll have to buy more ammunition.
You know, fundamentally when countries become weaker and are not getting development support, and these are countries that started incredibly impoverished, thatâs ultimately going to be not something good for our people who are living in that country, our people who are living in neighboring countries, and our interests over time. And those constituenciesâwhether itâs General Mattis or whether itâs Lindsey Graham, the chair of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee that works on foreign assistanceâyou know, Lindsey Graham has more in common with Patrick Leahy, a liberal senator from Vermont, on questions of foreign aid and probably ultimately the question of whether to invest in alliances, than he has in common with the current president.
So, so far youâre seeing the Congress assert itself more than we have seen in theâin foreign policy in a very long time. And I think that, again, without some of the same people who are willing to support a moreâagain, more sustaining the kind of foreign assistance that was offered during the Obama administration, they may want to stand quietly. They may not want to jump up and down and say, oh, look at me, Iâm supporting the United Nations, because thatâs just not a talking point in some of those circles. But nonetheless, they have traveledâsome of themâhave traveled the world and know how valuable the support that we offerâyou know, the humanitarian support and the support to the U.N. as a wholeâhow valuable that is to our standing in the world and our ability to then show up and call on countries and ask them to do what we want when we need it.
So I donâtâI donât see that coming anytime soon, but I also didnât see Donald Trump coming. (Laughs.) So take my predictionsâI wouldnâtâI wouldnât bet on my predictions. But I think people know how entangled we are with the rest of the world. Our economic, travel, you know, even people-to-people entanglements and relationships are much thicker than they were at the time the U.N. was founded. So to unwind that and unravel that would be extremely damaging and extremely painful. I donât see it happening.
FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question.
OPERATOR: Our next question comes from the University of Southern California.
Q: Hi. Is there still a place for responsibility to protect, or has that concept lost its relevance in recent years? Thank you.
POWER: Thank you. Well, itâs certainly not talked about as often or embraced with as much vigor as it was at its height, you know, sort of in the wake of Rwanda and the wake of East Timor and the wake of Kosovo. There was a sort of confidence that in all circumstances, the world could be mobilizedâwhen the world wasnât mobilized to protect people from mass atrocities it was a collective stain on our conscience, and that there were circumstances where the world could be mobilized and could effectively intervene to protect people, even using military force. So there was that confidence.
That confidence is gone. And itâs gone, first, because of the Iraq War. Probably second because of the horrors of Syria and the fact that even, like, the mass torture of people in prisonsâtorture and execution of people in prisons, giving them serial numbers, I mean, just almost, like, totalitarian terror inflicted on people, chemical weapons used at that, couldnât mobilize the international community to protect anybody practically on the ground. I think that is a big dent in the concept or the norm or the sense that countries are willing to abide by the norm. And then Libya, which was not done in the name of responsibility to protect as such but was done, you know, in order to prevent a massacreâthe fact that Libya has ended up, you know, in very difficult, violent, unstable circumstances as well is very different than how people felt after East Timor, after Kosovo.
So to your question, though, is there still a place, there is absolutely a place, because how could you live in a world and how could it be a stable world, even from a security standpoint, if governments are just able to massacre their people? If we tomorrow would see a Rwanda, 800,000 people being killed in 100 days and the world stood by. Thatâs not the world that we want to live in. Itâs not the world thatâs in our interest to inhabit. So I think the way that R2P gets talked about, appropriately, is about all of the other thing, short of military force, that need to be done in the face of mass atrocities. That was the concept originally. It wasnât meant to be yes or no or if, you know, intervening militarily. It was saying, look, if atrocities are being carried out, states have a responsibility to look past the sort of sovereign shield that states that are committing atrocities would like to envelop themselves in, and see what tools in the toolbox can you deploy at reasonable risk in order to help people.
And so that mindset of, like, whatâs in the toolbox and how do we help people is alive and well at the U.N. It doesnât mean it doesnât createâface friction or that very specific circumstances donât present specific challenges, like I mentioned earlier South Sudan and Burundi. But, you know, even on South Sudan, weâwhere thereâs way more deference to the government than I think is appropriate, given what the governmentâs doing to its people, but nonetheless peacekeepers on the ground. A new peacekeeping force was authorized.
You know, we, the United States, are able to put in place sanctions against a number of leaders who were stealing from their people and perpetrating mass atrocities. So itâs not what you would like to see. Youâd like to see a kind of well-oiled machine. We can just look at, at least, something like South Sudan the same way, and come up with a more robust collective solution that would really change the calculus of the leadership in South Sudan. Thatâs where weâre going with this. Thatâs a world where R2P is really sort of actionable for countriesâfor all the countries of the Security Council, and not just the Western countries.
So weâre not there. But weâre never going to get there, right? You donât changeâjust introducing a doctrine of R2P doesnât make Putin become a different person or have a different value set or operate differently within the U.N. But what I think R2Pâthe legacy of R2P is that in a way that was not the case at all in the early 1990s and certainly throughout the Cold War, is when atrocities are being committed against civiliansâand especially when theyâre committed by a governmentâthat used to be, like, end of conversation at the U.N. People would just say, oh, well, you know, if a government is doing it that itâs problem. We canât interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. No one talks like that anymore.
And so then you have disagreement about means, about which means should be employed. And you donât always put in place, in my view, the means that are more likely to change behavior on the ground. But no one with a straight face can argue that what happens inside a country is not the outside worldâs business.
FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question.
OPERATOR: Our next question comes from Washington and Lee University.
Q: Weâve heard of this movement in the community of global political theorists towards offshore balancing, in which the United States would assume a less-prevalent role abroad and relay their responsibilities to its allies and regions, like the Middle East and Africa. What consequences can we expect if we pursue this foreign policy model?
POWER: Well, I can tell you what it was like in the Security Council when aâwhen a crisis happened. And people issued their statementsâand, by people I mean people representing other countries, including powerful countries. And all the other ambassadors in the Security Council were kind of looking at their phones and theyâre, you know, jottingâdoing little drawings to themselves, or theyâre passing notes to one another. And theyâre waiting for the United States to speak, and waiting to hear, OK, whatâs the United States going to do about this problem, and how is the United States going to tell us what our role in addressing this problem is.
Now, thereâs a reason that people in the United States feel that theyâre kind of tired of carrying that burden, right? That, like, carrying that burden for 72 years of leading the world, like thatâs a steep burden. And thatâs why I and others, you know, made a concerted push, for instance, to get European countries back into U.N. peacekeeping, which the United States doesnât really do. We may for it, and pay 28 percent of the peacekeeping budget. Other countries pay 72 percent. So itâs still a good deal, I think, for the taxpayer, given where theseâthe dangerous environments these peacekeepers go to. But, like, my feeling was European defense budgets are shrinking and they need to fight in the ISIS coalition, help us in terms of Eastern European defense or, you know, get into U.N. peacekeeping. You know, like, choose your option there, and preferable do all three, and have a defense budget commensurate with the threats of our time.
And so I think that those questions that the American peopleâsome share of the American people are asking on the right and left are very reasonable questions. And they require sustained diplomacy and pressure on other countries. But the notion that we can just walk away and then think that other countries are going to fill that vacuum, which I think is, at least as youâve articulated, the theory part of the conceptionâitâs just not going to happen. So we have a right and an interest in demanding more leadership and more certainly more followership from other countries, and more resources and more skin in the game.
But, A, this kind of almostâthis theoretical model that, like, in game theory would reveal other countries stepping into the breach, because they recognize that itâs in their interest to see leadership and absent U.S. leadership they then say to themselves, oh, well, then it has to be ours. I justâI think the cost to our interests of that period of vacuum and sort of self-help that would go on around the world would be devastating. So weâve got to find a balance. We canât sustain the burdens that are being maintained and not see more contributions from more countries. And thatâs the approach we took, for instance, on climate. Going right to China, getting India to make commitments and sacrifices on climate that they never contemplated making before, getting Europeans and other advanced countries into U.N. peacekeeping, getting defense budgets up.
Like, all of those are the right issues to be pushing, and many, many more along those lines. But the way to get what you want when youâre pushing that agenda is not by offending everybody, you know, pulling funding, saying itâs over to you, youâre the one whoâs going toâif thatâs the attitude you take youâre not going to get leadership from other countries, or followership. And that, unfortunately, seems to be where weâre trending.
FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question.
OPERATOR: Our next question comes from the University of Richmond.
Q: Thank you for speaking with us. So you talked about how countries around the world, such as South Sudan, feel impunity from the U.N. now. But my question is what about more well-established or respected states, such as the example of Israel and (Arab world in peace ?)? Are there ways to enforce compliance with U.N. measures that wouldnât kind of impinge on those rights of sovereignty that are still widely accepted around the world?
POWER: Well, as it relates to the issue of Israel, the U.N. is just a very toxic environment to deal with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Itâs toxic because every year there are 18 resolutions, roughly, taken out against Israel, given, you know, some legitimate concerns about the occupation and given some wild, frankly anti-Semiticâarguments made by member states of the U.N. But thatâs 18 resolutions in General Assembly. And guess how many there are on Bashar al-Assad gassing his people, torturing his people, you know, killing probably 400,000, 500,000 people, so far? One. And itâs aâand itâs, you know, a real effort to get that one resolution through. One on North Korea, with the gulags and so forth.
So I think, you know, fundamentally the way to deal with theâyou know, with terrorism in the region, with the security concerns that the Israelis have, with the need to end the occupation is through a peace process where both sides give. Thatâs why we invested, through Secretary Kerryâs leadership, so many yearsâand, prior to that, George Mitchellâs leadership. But fundamentally, you know, the circumstances havenât caused the parties to, you know, want to pursue that agreement. But I donâtâbecause of the history at the U.N., and the amount of animus toward the state of Israel just for existingâwhich persists.
You know, Israel, I think, is taking a constructive approach now, which is to invest in bilateral relationships around the world. So I just heard that, like, in the wake of the hurricanes they were doing, you know, really important work in the Caribbean. They came in after the Haiti earthquake and investedâyou know, sent a medical team, I believe. Theyâre trying to be active in South Sudan. In terms of, you know, what you can do of state building in a conflict environment. I think continuing to build those relationships will, over time, change the climate at the U.N. But the conflict is always going to be, you know, a source of concern across the organization. And Israel is very skeptical that it can getâunderstandably, again, because of the historyâthat it can get anywhere near a fair shake at the U.N., because of the bias.
FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question.
OPERATOR: Our next question comes from the University of Arizona College of Law.
Q: Hello. Thank you for your time and your insight. U.S. elections certainly have an impact on global politics, but they often focus on internal domestic affairs. And it seems like sometimes that things like the U.N. are very far from our political efficacy. So is there a way for the average citizen to really support the U.S. being a responsible actor and, you know, promoting a good world order?
POWER: ThanksâI mean, thank you for the question. I thinkâI think that the U.N. as such has never made a great bumper sticker, you know, for lack of a better word. Like, the polling for the U.N. now is actually better than itâs been in quite a long time. I just saw some polls yesterday. Itâs not above 50 percent, the favorability, but itâs, you know, not that far off. And it was trending upward, at least before Trump took over. But I think the main way that our nationâs relationship with the U.N. and our popular cultureâs understanding of the U.N. changes is, you know, by virtue of how our leaders talk about this organization.
And so, you know, if youâve living in a district thatâs represented particularly by Republicans, who have tended to be particularly hard on the U.N. and very suspicious ofâyou know, I think a really quite far-fetched idea of what the U.N. or the secretary-general would ever be capable of doing. You know, whatever about their wantsâyou know, I canât know the intentions of those individuals, I wonât speak to those. But thereâs just no capability to do the things that people who caricature the U.N. accuse the U.N. of setting out to do.
But I think engaging Republicans, encouraging travelâyou know, just as a constituent even, or if youâre better plugged in better yet. Encouraging the staff of Republican members of Congress and others, or even mayors, you know, to travel abroad and to see concretely what theâwhat the U.N. agencies are doing, or concretely what a foreign conflict and crisis looks like. Those exposures, I think, have become fewer. And thatâs one reason our foreign policy has become more divided on partisan lines than we had seen previously.
John McCain and Lindsey Graham are the leaders they are on foreign policy in theâin the GOP, in part because they know the world so well. I mean, they spent years of their lives meeting with foreign leaders and visiting refugee camps and seeing up close, you know, what suffering looks like, and how threats to us get nested and start to grow. And so that experiences and those exposures are really, really important. And as fundraising becomes more important in elections, and members of Congress have to go back to their districts more and more, those trips for newer members become fewer and farther between.
So thatâs what I think, just anything you could do to sort of encourage people who are on the more skeptical side to justâto get some more exposure and to see it up close, so it isnât just the negative bumper sticker. Because I think the critics of the U.N. have actually been quite effective with the bumper stickers over the years. But the second thing Iâd say, reflecting my own bias as someone who comes out of the last administration and is very critical of the current administration, is, you know, to haveâI mean, Trumpâs views are what they are. They are what has been articulated. Now, they evolve, as it were, you know, sometimes in the same day.
But you know, fundamentally there is a choice, right? As citizens the same thing that makes us eager toâwe, who are Democratsâeager to see the House change hands in 2018 and investing in local campaigns and things to try to make that happen, who believe in divided government in circumstances such as these, who are frightened about what it would mean to have a full four years of this worldview and this hostility to the U.N. controlling all threeâyou know, led by the president, not reflected always by the GOP, but with some support in the Senate and House.
That, you know, is going to do damage to public support for the U.N. because hearing from your president and from others over and over again that this is an institution thatâs not looking out for your interests, thatâs a threat to your sovereignty, thatâs going to take your guns away or your landâI mean, that just erodesâthatâs going to erode public trust. And so changing that, changing our leadership, having a leadership that live in the 21st century and understand that threats cross borders and that we need to understand the limits of these organizations, for sure, but in order to transcend those limits, not in order to sabotage the enterprise.
So my basic message is politics matter. And engaging the GOP to encourage more exposures, and Democrats but especially the GOP whoâve been on the more skeptical side. And then working hard at a grassroots level to put into office people who share a belief that flawed and, you know, massively frustrating though the U.N. can be, you know, itâs the principal organ to deal withâitâs the only organ, really, that represents every country to deal with transnational threats of a global scale. And itâs the principal organ that we need to deal with threats to peace and security. And so for the sake of our kids, weâve got to develop a constructive working relationship with it, and harness it to our ends.
FASKIANOS: I think we have time for one last question.
OPERATOR: Our next question comes from the University of Southern Mississippi.
Q: This is Todd Barry with USM.
Professor Power, itâs an honor to speak with you. Thank you for your service to our country and for talking with us today.
During the Ukraine crisis, you said at the U.N. that the Ukrainian leader had fled. How much consideration was there at the U.N. to creating some sort of Ukrainian government? And second, when should the U.S. bring issues to the U.N., and when is it best for the U.S. to work outside of the U.N.?
POWER: Thank you for your kind words. I miss public service every day, so this is definitely the most rewarding chapter in my life and I feel very blessed to have had that opportunity, though I am glad to actually see my children now day today and to get to watch them grow up a little bit.
So I think itâs hard toâon your second questionâI think I have unsatisfying answers to both your questions. But on your second question, itâs quite hard to generalize. I mean, you know, I donât believe taking any problem immediately to the scrum of the large number of countries that comprise either the Security Council, 15, or the General Assembly, 193, thatâs almost never the way to roll in international diplomacy. What youâwhat I would do when I wanted to work, for instance, at a challenging peacekeeping issue, or even a security issue, where weâre not going to solve the problem as a whole because our countries were so divided.
But I worked so hard with the Russian ambassador to try, at least, to deal with the chemical weapons issue. And we were partially successful, not fully successful. But we did manage to get, you know, a remarkable number of tons of chemical weapons out of Syria, did manage to create a joint investigative mechanism together. Had I brought that to the 15, you know, just as me, as the United States, he would have felt pressured in that settingâand probably by his own government, his own presidentâto just say the opposite of whatever the United States is saying. So you work behind the scenes. You see whatâs possible, what you can extract from the countries that are the most relevant, for whatever the issue is. President Obama, as I mentioned earlier, went to President Xi on climate before going to any other country. We couldnât show up in Paris unless we knew what we and the Chinese were prepared to give and to sacrifice.
So I guess what Iâd say is I donât knowâlike, you donât have to go to the U.N. as such, like that building in Manhattan, to get something done. The best multilateral diplomacy starts with a small circle and then just addsâsort of tacks countries on. I think thatâs what Paris really was. I think thatâs what Ebola was. Tacks people on to coalitions.
The ISIS coalition lives very much outside the U.N. Thatâs an example, terrorism, where, you know, if youâre doing warfighting, you know, having a NATO foundation and, again, adding countries from outside NATO, that can be the right direction. But itâs hard to generalize. But there is no institution in it that has all the countries. And so if youâre looking to expand what we might call a P2âyou know, a partnership of two countriesâto a P10, itâs a very efficient place to go to try to peel those countries apart, especially if you want to do something thatâs cross-regional. And doing something cross-regionalâmeaning with some Africans, some Latins, some Asians perhaps, or some other permutationâwhen you do things that way, the image that it projects to the country that youâre, you know, operating in or trying to influence is often enhanced by that sense that itâs notâitâs not just Western countries or itâs not just, you know, neighbors to a country in question. That sort of cross-regional, thatâs what the U.N.âone of the reasons it was conceived and peacekeeping was conceived was to bring countries from all over the world so that it projects universal norms rather than any one country or any one regionâs agenda.
So I think that answers that question a little bit.
And then, on the Ukraine question, I think, you know, everything moved very, very quickly, and it was initiallyâbefore the Ukrainian president absconded, you know, he had signed this agreement. And so I think we were of the viewâcertainly, I was of the view in New YorkâI canât speak for, like, the people in my government who speak Ukrainian and are, you know, Ukraine hands who were tracking this at a level of detail that I wasnât in New Yorkâbut our view in New York was that the parties on the ground had forged their own compromise. And so, you know, for us to then, you know, meddle in the middle of that and say, oh no, letâs bring that issue to New York or letâs try to enshrine it in a U.N. agreement, it didnâtâat theâat the penultimate moment, it didnât feel as though that would be additive when things seemed to be tracking. Then, at the moment things were not tracking at all and the president fledâdisappeared initially and thenâand, you know, sort of it was announced that he had fled, at that point, then, the crisis, I think, was underway. And going back in time is something we very much tried to do, and tried to encourage a return to the agreement that had been signed. But thatâs not what happened.
FASKIANOS: I am sorry to say that we are out of time. We had so many questions still in queue, and I apologize to all of you that we could not get to you, but we try to end on time.
Ambassador Power, thank you for being with us, for sharing your perspective and expertise with us, for your service to our country, and your amazing work as a journalist prior to going into government. I hope that you all look at Ambassador Powerâs New York Times op-ed that was published on I think September 19th. You can also follow her on Twitter at @SamanthaJPower, so you can keep up with her there. And we really appreciate your being with us.
POWER: I have one more plug, Irina, if I could.
FASKIANOS: Sure.
POWER: Thereâs a new movie coming outâthereâs a new movie coming out. Itâs not out yet, but you can Google it. Itâs called âThe Final Year.â And for those of you, especially young people and professors who get to teach young people, itâs, I think, a really unusual insight into how diplomacy is done. Itâs a group of filmmakerâOscar-winning filmmakers who followed Secretary Kerry, myself, a few other Obama administration officials around as we conducted diplomacy the last year in office. Unfortunately, one of the reviewers likened it to a horror movie becauseâ(laughs)âwe are these gullible characters who donât know how the storyâs going to end, that a lot of our work is going to be subjected to some scrutiny by our successors. So we donât know that when the film is filmed, so you get to see kind of theâa lot of caring and a lot of trying, and some really important results, I think, put on the board in climate, Iran, you know, other issues, Cuba. But it will be airing on HBO in the new year, but theyâre starting screenings just in the next couple months. So Iâso I recommend it to you. Itâs called âThe Final Year.â
FASKIANOS: Thatâs wonderful. Thank you. Weâll keep an eye out for that. So thank you again.
And for all of you, our next call will be on Wednesday, October 11th at 12 p.m. with Shannon OâNeill, who is a senior fellow here at CFR for Latin American studies, and she will be talking about U.S.-Latin America relations. So I also hope youâll follow us on CFR Campus on Twitter at @CFR_Campus, as well as go to our website, CFR.org, and Foreign Affairs for information and analysis about whatâs going on in the world today. So thank you all.
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