Malaysia’s New Prime Minister and the Future of Chinese Investment
from Asia Unbound and Asia Program

Malaysia’s New Prime Minister and the Future of Chinese Investment

How will a new prime minister affect Chinese investment in Malaysia? 
New Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob waves from a car, as he leaves after the inauguration ceremony, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on August 21, 2021.
New Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob waves from a car, as he leaves after the inauguration ceremony, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on August 21, 2021. Lim Huey Teng/Reuters

Benjamin Blythe is a graduate student at Indiana University’s Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies and O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs. His research focuses on Chinese politics, East and Southeast Asian affairs, and international development.

On August 20, 2021, Ismail Sabri Yaakob became the new prime minister of Malaysia, capping two years of political crises. Malaysia’s king selected Ismail following the resignation of previous Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin due to his mishandling of the country’s COVID-19 response. Muhyiddin himself assumed office after his predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, resigned in March 2020 due to party infighting. As a returning candidate in the 2018 election, Mahathir led an opposition coalition to power for the first time in Malaysian history, beating incumbent Prime Minister Najib Razak. Every prime minister before 2018 belonged to the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) political party, meaning that Ismail’s ascension marks UMNO’s return to power.

These interparty dynamics in Malaysia have powerfully shaped patterns of Chinese investment. In the lead-up to the 2018 election, Mahathir and his coalition of opposition parties used the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), a rail line being constructed under the auspices of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as a key campaign issue. Najib led the negotiations on ECRL and presented it as an economic boon for Malaysia. Mahathir, on the other hand, critiqued ECRL’s Chinese financing. Australian National University research fellow Dr. Amrita Malhi suggests that Mahathir’s coalition used ECRL to reframe the “China threat” away from the nation’s ethnic Chinese minority (21 percent of the population) toward the risks that China’s influence posed for Malaysia’s sovereignty. Pre-election concerns over national sovereignty were also originated in revelations over the 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) financial scandal tying Najib and UMNO to a graft-riddled sovereign wealth fund supported by China. After winning the 2018 election, Mahathir’s administration halted ECRL’s construction and arrested Najib for 1MDB-related corruption. In these investigations, Najib’s former special officer claimed that Chinese government officials were willing to exchange bailouts for 1MDB debts for construction contracts, including ECRL.

New Prime Minister Ismail and UMNO are likely to support ECRL and continue promoting high-profile Chinese investments in Malaysia. In 2017, Ismail refuted Mahathir’s claims that ECRL and other BRI projects were “selling off the country.” In 2018, he claimed that Mahathir’s coalition was punishing ECRL’s workers (the majority of whom were from China) by canceling ECRL to renegotiate a better price. The project’s proposed path in 2016, which cuts through UMNO and its allied parties’ constituencies on the Malaysian peninsula’s east coast, was closely correlated with votes for UMNO’s coalition in the 2018 election (see maps below.) ECRL will remain a hot-button political issue as Ismail appears set to continue advertising the project’s economic benefits to a relatively underdeveloped region to gain support from his ethnic Malay base.

Map 1: Original 2016 Proposal for the ECRL Route. East Coast Rail Line ECRL-01

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Map 2: Shift in Votes in the 2018 Malaysian Election in Peninsular Malaysia.

(Note: BN (blue) is UMNO’s coalition, while PH (red) is Mahathir’s coalition.)

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No longer just contractors, Chinese state-owned developers have emerged as key players in Malaysian politics. China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), the state-owned company contracted to construct ECRL, sent representatives to Malaysia in 2018 as pressure for Najib to call an election increased. At one of these meetings, CCCC’s vice president stated (in a now-archived website) that the company should “expound politics in the political projects” and emphasized the need to build domestic support for the railway. In addition, after Najib called the election, China’s ambassador to Malaysia campaigned with members of UMNO’s coalition.

Chinese companies’ response to political turmoil in Malaysia is just one example of how Belt and Road investments are reshaping domestic politics worldwide, from Ghana to Sri Lanka. China Foreign Affairs University professor Wenjuan Nie notes how Chinese government banks and ministries provide financial and political support for Chinese state-owned companies to partner with foreign governments and firms on large infrastructure projects. Beyond specific projects, state-to-state interactions like meetings between leaders provide channels for Chinese political leaders to support the prestige of China-friendly administrations and parties abroad. In return, local leaders can reap the domestic political benefits of infrastructure improvements and the optics of negotiating with a great power.

Democracies with unstable leadership may be particularly susceptible to the influence of Chinese infrastructure investment on domestic politics. University of Denver professor Alvin Camba argues that Chinese firm and state leaders prefer leaders “who hold legitimate power” and are wary of competing power interests that may reject or seek to revise investment project terms. However, changes in leadership may provide blank slates for Chinese state-owned enterprises to negotiate better terms as new leaders seek to deliver early domestic political wins. In Malaysia, both Mahathir and Muhyiddin’s administrations renegotiated ECRL shortly after coming into office. Mahathir’s administration cut the ECRL’s cost by roughly $16 billion in exchange for CCCC resuming construction in April 2019, while Muhyiddin’s administration accepted an increase of over $12 billion in costs for a lengthened route in April 2021. Even if Chinese leaders prefer the stability of incumbency, they will take advantage of new leaders’ domestic political positioning to encourage continued investment in the long-term.

Ismail’s political ascent and UMNO’s return to power in Malaysia suggest that Chinese actors may seek to exploit domestic political divisions to maximize economic benefits. Chinese state-owned companies’ recognition of domestic politics’ influence on infrastructure projects’ viability will remain relevant as ECRL and other projects continue construction in the run-up to the next Malaysian election scheduled for 2023. Ismail is likely to defend UMNO’s ties to China and advertise the economic benefits of ECRL and other BRI projects in his bid for re-election, much like Najib in 2018. As the case of Malaysia reveals, Chinese investment projects are increasingly becoming political footballs in Southeast Asia and worldwide.

More on:

Southeast Asia

Malaysia

China

Belt and Road Initiative

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