Fickle Friends: Sino-Israeli Ties Buckle Amid War With Hamas

Leading up to Hamas’s October 7 attack, Israel was attempting to manage great power competition much like many of its regional neighbors​:​ extracting benefits from both China and the United States to the greatest degree possible. Israel counted on the United States for military aid and diplomatic support but turned to China to further serve its commercial interests, especially in the areas of infrastructure development and advanced technology. For much of the past decade, that arrangement has proven to be beneficial for both Israel and China, and Israel’s leaders have worked to deepen Sino-Israeli bonds. But China’s response to the crisis in the Gaza Strip and its perceived alignment with the Palestinians has jeopardized these ties. China’s decision to risk its relationship with Israel reflects its desire to leverage the war in Gaza as an opportunity to expand its regional influence while undercutting the United States’s​, even if that comes at the expense of Sino-Israeli relations.​​​​  

Over the past decade, China has worked to strengthen both its economic and political ties with Middle Eastern countries, including the United States’s closest and oldest allies. Beijing’s shift in behavior has challenged Washington’s regional dominance. Last spring, China brokered a diplomatic agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a kingdom which boasts strong U.S. ties dating back to President Roosevelt. Later in the year, during U.S.-led Israeli-Saudi normalization negotiations, Saudi Arabia attempted to use a Chinese bid for a nuclear plant in the kingdom to pressure the United States into accepting Saudi Arabia’s demand for a domestic civilian nuclear program, one of its conditions for establishing ties with Israel. Meanwhile, as early as 2013, the United Arab Emirates, which calls itself a “close friend and strong ally” of the United States, successfully played China and the United States off of each other to secure the Chinese version of U.S. Predator drones after the United States refused to sell the Emiratis their own model. 

Official Sino-Israeli ties date back to the 1990s, but in 2013 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took action to develop a closer commercial relationship with China as part of his efforts to build up Israel’s economy and bolster his reputation as “Mr. Finance.”  That year, Netanyahu’s Government Decision #251, “Strengthening Economic Cooperation with China [Hebrew],” marked the beginning of Israel’s efforts to expand its Chinese ties, primarily through infrastructure projects and investments in Israel’s high-tech sector. Chinese state-owned companies have developed private ports in Israeli cities including Ashdod and are currently building a hydropower facility in Kokhav Hayarden. Between 2014 and 2016 alone, Chinese venture capital investments in Israel’s high-tech sector doubled from $500 million to $1 billion.   

These developments have raised concerns in the United States, where officials worry that these Chinese inroads threaten U.S. national security interests. In 2021, CIA Director Bill Burns warned Israel’s then Prime Minister Naftali Bennett about Chinese investments in its infrastructure and potential ​associated ​espionage concerns. For example, Israel’s decision to allow a Chinese company to build a container port in Haifa raised alarm bells for U.S. government officials who feared China’s true motivation in building the Haifa port was the opportunity to spy on the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet, which docks nearby. Officials from both Republican and Democratic administrations have cautioned Israel about ​Chinese​ access to Israel’s infrastructure and high-tech sector, especially companies that focus on critical technologies with dual-use capabilities, ​such as ​semiconductor​s​, which the United States is working to keep out of China’s hands but could more easily be transferred from Israel to China.   

While Israel has increasingly caved to U.S. pressure on these issues, for example denying Chinese bids for a desalination plant in 2020 and a Tel Aviv light rail project in 2022, during moments of disagreement with the Biden administration, Netanyahu had attempted to cynically leverage U.S. concerns over Sino-Israeli ties for Israel’s benefit. Early last year, after Joe Biden made it clear publicly that he would not be inviting Netanyahu to the White House given the controversy around his government’s proposed judicial reforms, Netanyahu announced that he would be visiting ​​President Xi Jinping in China. Many in the United States and Israel interpreted this as a signal to the Biden administration that Israel has other options should the United States continue to ice Netanyahu out. The proposed trip also served Chinese interests by undermining the United States’s relationship with its closest regional ally, Israel, and giving China yet another opportunity to portray itself a significant Middle East player, building off of its recent success in negotiating a restoration of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This diplomatic move from Israel, on top of its ​​extensive economic relationship with China, may well have contributed to the Biden administration’s decision to look past its strong disagreements with Netanyahu, invite him to the White House, and engage in intensive efforts late last summer and early fall to broker a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, a key component of which would have been limiting China’s regional footprint.   

Given China’s response to the war in Gaza, Bibi’s public efforts to revive Israel’s relationship with China during periods of strife with the United States now appear short sighted. Since October 7, Israeli government officials have ​​publicly expressed their displeasure with what they perceive as China’s anti-Israel actions. Beijing’s first official statement on Hamas’s attacks came a day after October 7 and critically did not condemn Hamas nor include language on Israel’s right to defend itself. China only modified its comments to condemn civilian casualties after pressure from U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer. Xi has since publicly criticized Israel, urging it to end the “collective punishment” of Gazan civilians. Chinese social media and state TV are inundated with antisemitic content, including Hitler memes and comments accusing Jews of wielding disproportionate influence in the United States. Despite the Chinese government’s robust censorship capabilities, many of these posts have remained online, suggesting that the government does not find these narratives threatening to its current position on the conflict. Ironically, China is also now making it harder for Israel’s high-tech companies to import Chinese dual use components, a move the United States has been encouraging Israel to take against China for years. These developments have hurt Sino-Israeli relations, and Israeli politicians have directly expressed their “deep disappointment” to Chinese officials.   

Despite this Israeli backlash, China has not changed its course because it stands to gain more regionally, and throughout the Global South, by positioning itself as pro-Palestinian. China is leveraging this moment to portray a sharp distinction between itself and the United States. Its online influence campaigns have promoted the narrative that the United States is driving this war, and, after China voted for a UN resolution on the conflict that the United States abstained from, Chinese Ambassador Zhang Jun released a statement directed at the United States saying, “For reasons known to all, in particular, the repeated and persistent obstruction of a permanent member of the Council, this resolution at present can only serve as a first step based on minimum consensus.” In November, China hosted officials from Arab and Muslim majority nations for a summit aimed at establishing an immediate ceasefire, something Biden still has not called for. BRICS has also provided an avenue for China to strengthen its own regional reputation while simultaneously undermining the United States’s. During August’s BRICS Summit, the bloc announced that Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE would be joining the group. Three months later, during the bloc’s first meeting with these new member states, Xi delivered a speech lambasting Israel’s assault on Gaza, reiterating China’s calls for a ceasefire, and affirming the Palestinian right of return, a position the United States rejected under Trump for Palestinians from 1948 Israel. Three of the new BRICS member states in attendance, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, are some of the United States's closest allies in the region, and through delivering these remarks at a multilateral venue with no U.S. participation, China was able to draw a sharp contrast between its position on the war and the United States’s, exploiting a wedge between the United States and its key regional partners. While China may have enjoyed a somewhat amicable relationship with Israel before October 7, in light of Israel’s brutal and unpopular attack on Gaza, China is willing to forgo that to deepen its relationships with other regional powers.   

Still, China’s current ​​support for Palestinians appears to be mostly superficial and self-serving. ​​China’s interests in the region mirror the United States’s: access to oil and freedom of navigation. Even though Beijing’s status as the number one importer of Iranian oil gives it influence over Tehran, so far, it has only attempted to meaningfully use that leverage in pursuit of its own goals, not Palestinians's. As the Iranian-backed Houthis have continued their attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, increasing freight costs for Chinese companies and threatening its already beleaguered economy with another potential setback, China has privately urged Iran to rein in the Houthis or risk Iran's business relations with China. While the United States has announced over $120 million in humanitarian aid to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, China has only donated $2.06 million (although, during a recent trip to Egypt, China’s foreign minister announced his government would be sending more aid soon). For now, China seems content to let the United States weigh itself down with this conflict while China offers rhetorical support to Palestinians. ​​If that approach threatens its relationship with Israel, China is willing to take that risk.  

Simone Lipkind is the Research Associate for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations